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This thesis examines the encryption policies of Israel and China in an effort to 
determine whether their respective approaches effectively and reasonably address the 
issue of law enforcement access to encrypted devices in the United States. The 
proliferation of encrypted devices poses a growing challenge to law enforcement 
agencies in their efforts to gather evidence. Meanwhile, an ongoing debate, decades in the 
making, persists between those arguing for and against easing the means by which the 
government accesses these encrypted devices. Using qualitative analysis, the thesis 
assesses the encryption policies of Israel and China in terms of legality, cost, political 
acceptance, and potential for success in their application within the United States. Based 
on this analysis, this thesis recommends policymakers give consideration to a solution 
that resembles Israel’s approach. The characteristics of this model include creating, under 
existing laws, a centralized forensic laboratory supported by a network of examiners 
located across the country working to gain access to encrypted devices through 
vulnerabilities. These efforts would be bolstered by relationships with the private sector 
and academia. Tailoring the U.S. device encryption approach to be more consistent in 
structure with that of Israel has the potential to bring the United States closer to a viable 
domestic solution. 
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According to the Pew Research Center, more than 95% of adults in the United 
States have a cell phone.1 Digital technology has permeated almost every facet of daily 
life, and electronic devices are driving this trend.2 As biometric identification increases 
and payment systems like Apple Pay proliferate, it is reasonable to believe devices will 
soon be the proxy for those items, as well. Hardware and software manufacturers are 
enabling encryption capabilities on many of these devices to protect information from 
being compromised. While this security is a benefit to many, strong device encryption 
poses problems for U.S. law enforcement agencies, which have come to rely on data 
contained on devices in their investigations. The information contained on a device is 
vast and can be crucial to law enforcement in their investigations. However, the inability 
of law enforcement to access or see the information on a device due to encryption 
precludes this retrieval from happening. This concept is known as “going dark.”3  
The going dark issue is present, prevalent, and growing. In 2016, Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) general counsel Jim Baker said that the FBI is able to get the data 
it needs 87% of the time.4 In 2017, FBI Director Christopher Wray testified this number 
dropped to 50% of the time in fiscal year 2017.5 Emerging from this trend is a renewed, 
decades-old debate over the means by which the government accesses these encrypted 
devices. It is a flashpoint between those in law enforcement who generally advocate a 
                                                 
1 “Mobile Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
fact-sheet/mobile/.  
2 For the purposes of this thesis, the term, “device” describes portable electronic communication 
devices like cellular smartphones and tablets.  
3 “Going Dark,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed June 1, 2017, https://www.fbi.gov/services/ 
operational-technology/going-dark. 
4 Jeff John Roberts, “Locked Apple Devices Are Piling Up in Police Evidence Rooms,” Fortune, 
November 17, 2016, http://fortune.com/2016/11/17/locked-apple-devices-are-piling-up-in-police-evidence-
rooms/. 
5 Department of Justice, Statement of Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives at a Hearing Entitled, ‘Oversight of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Presented December 7, 2017 
(Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2017), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp.content/uploads/2017/12/ 
Director-Wray-Testimony.pdf. 
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regimented, industry-supported approach enabling ready access to encrypted data, and 
technologists and civil libertarians who are opposed to it. Ironically, both groups in the 
dispute recognize the need for encryption, as well as the need for government access. 
However, the two are unable to reach a consensus on reasonably meeting both 
requirements. While the government is locked in debate, the United States lacks a 
domestic solution to the issue.  
This thesis examines and evaluates the primary encryption approaches of Israel 
and China in an effort to determine whether their respective approaches effectively and 
reasonably address the issue of access to encrypted devices in ways that could contribute 
to resolving debate in the United States. Using qualitative analysis, the thesis assesses the 
encryption approaches of Israel and China in terms of legality, cost, political acceptance, 
and potential for success for application within the United States. The Israeli model, 
structural in nature, focuses on the exploitation of encryption and forensic extraction of 
devices by the Israel Police cybercrime unit; it proved to be a reasonable and potentially 
effective model for the United States. The Chinese model, a legislative-based solution, 
compels telecommunications providers to assist with gaining access to devices; it was 
found to be an unreasonable and ineffective model for the United States. Based on the 
results of the analysis of available information, this thesis recommends implementing a 
new initiative in the United States based on the Israeli model.  
The success Israel has in the world of encryption and device data extraction is 
grounded in the Israel Police’s cybercrime unit and its collaborative partnerships with the 
military, private sector, and academia. The unit has a centralized forensic laboratory, and 
a network of officers strategically located across the country who specialize in data 
extraction from electronic devices. The fact that encryption is inherently vulnerable is a 
key takeaway of this thesis, and Israel’s approach is best suited to take advantage of this 
weakness. While restructuring U.S. law enforcement in an identical way to Israel is 
unrealistic, this thesis recommends considering changes to the approach of U.S. law 
enforcement’s efforts consistent with characteristics of the Israeli model. The United 
States already has satisfactory legal authorities, with adequate oversight, within which it 
can leverage means like “lawful hacking” to access devices with this approach. Changes 
 xvii 
to U.S. law enforcement efforts include organizing its structure to be collectively and 
singularly focused on defeating device encryption, staffed with the appropriate personnel, 
and supported by adequate resources and external partners. This effort can be 
accomplished by aligning device encryption efforts under the leadership of one federal 
agency tasked with coordinating the work of federal, state, and local law enforcement 
partners operating in laboratories across the county in collaboration with partners in the 
private sector and academia contributing to the mission.  
Tailoring the U.S. device encryption approach to implement core features of the 
Israeli model has the potential to bring the United States closer to a viable domestic 
solution. Application of the Israeli approach to device encryption issues in the United 
States is a reasonable solution with a strong likelihood to be effective. Above all, this 
thesis contributes to a growing body of academic literature supporting a view that 
continuing a paralytic debate on the issue serves nobody’s interests. The onus is on those 
who hold absolutist positions in this debate to allow a reasonable and effective solution to 
be implemented in the United States.  
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Smartphones, led by iPhone, have become an essential part of our lives.1 
—Tim Cook 
CEO, Apple Inc. 
 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
According to the Pew Research Center, more than 95 percent of adults in the 
United States have a cell phone.2 It is unlikely a more common item is in a person’s 
direct possession other than currency and identification documents. As biometric 
identification increases and payment systems like Apple Pay proliferate, it is reasonable 
to believe devices will soon be the proxy for those items as well.3 As a result, a call for 
strong encryption has arisen to protect this information from being compromised.  
Encryption of data is growing in importance and has become a mainstay in topics 
of security forums across the United States. Encryption is the coded protection of 
information in the cyber universe accessible only to those with the appropriate keys to 
view that data. It is used to protect information and can exist in real-time and stored 
communications. Real-time communications are those live, in-process communications 
between two entities. Encryption of data in motion is known as end-to-end encryption, 
                                                 
1 “A Message to Our Customers,” Apple, February 16, 2016, https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/. 
2 “Mobile Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
fact-sheet/mobile/.  
3 For the purposes of this thesis, the term, “device” describes portable electronic communication 
devices like cellular smartphones and tablets.  
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which is generally a focus of intelligence agencies.4 Encrypted communications stored on 
hardware, such as cell phones or applications within the phone, is typically referred to as 
device encryption. This type of encryption is commonly encountered by law enforcement 
and the challenge of exploiting this encrypted data at rest in devices is the focus of this 
thesis.  
Strong device encryption poses problems for U.S. law enforcement agencies, 
which have come to rely on data contained on devices like cell phones in their 
investigations. This problem will not soon change. The information contained on a cell 
phone is vast and can include geo-location activity, critical communications, 
photographs, and applications used to perpetrate crimes. Using this data in their criminal 
investigations, law enforcement professionals are able to piece together timelines, gather 
evidence, identify co-conspirators, and prove or disprove alibis. However, the inability of 
law enforcement to access or see the information on a device due to encryption precludes 
this retrieval from happening. This concept is known as “going dark.”5 Technology 
companies and telecommunications providers are gaining the ability to add encryption to 
their products at a rapid rate with relative ease. The threat to law enforcement is that 
                                                 
4 Law enforcement agencies also rely on information obtained from live, in-process communications, 
referred to as Title III wire intercepts. However, the use of electronic surveillance is an investigative 
technique of last resort. Due to the comprehensive legal guidelines that protect citizens from this intrusive 
technique, and the rigor involved in operating a wire, it is an uncommon law enforcement technique. 
Moreover, of the 14,500 wiretaps ordered in the country between 2012 and 2015, only 152 encountered 
encryption; of those 152, only 30 could not ultimately be decrypted, or .2% of the total. On the other hand, 
law enforcement commonly relies on evidence found on electronic devices. Based on data collected over a 
six-month period by the FBI published in a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 
April 2016, the FBI was unable to access 13% of the phones they collected. Meanwhile, between October 
2014 and October 2016, the New York County District Attorney’s Office could not access over 33% of the 
devices in their possession related to crimes. For this primary reason, this thesis will focus on the latter 
issue. See “Wiretap Reports,” U.S. Courts, accessed June 1, 2017, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/analysis -reports/wiretap-reports; James A. Lewis, Denise E. Zheng, and William A. Carter, The 
Effect of Encryption on Lawful Access to Communications and Data (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 
& International Studies, 2017), 13–14, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/1702 
21_Lewis_EncryptionsEffect_Web.pdf?HQT76OwM4itFrLEIok6kZajkd5a.r.rE; District Attorney New 
York County, Third Report of the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office on Smartphone Encryption and 
Public Safety (New York: Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, 2017), http://manhattanda.org/sites/ 
default/les/Report%20on%20Smartphone%20Encryption%20 and%20Public%20Safety:%20An%20 
Update.pdf. 
5 “Going Dark,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed June 1, 2017, https://www.fbi.gov/services/ 
operational-technology/going-dark; Geoffrey S. Corn, “Averting the Inherent Dangers of ‘Going Dark’: 
Why Congress Must Require a Locked Front Door to Encrypted Data,” Washington and Lee Law Review 
72, no. 3 (Summer 2015): 1433, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4469& 
context=wlulr.  
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these technological advances will leave law enforcement at a significant disadvantage in 
their mission to protect citizens of this country.  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is at the forefront of the issue 
following a legal battle with Apple over access to an iPhone belonging to one of the 
perpetrators of a terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California. While the deliberation 
over the right to privacy versus the right to government access continues in forums across 
the country, an opportunity has arisen to discuss the future of U.S. policy options. 
Exceptional access advocates argue a reasonable, obvious solution exists. They believe 
that at some reasonable level, given appropriate circumstances, the government does have 
a right to compel third parties to provide or assist with access to devices that are 
encrypted.6 It is obvious because in their view, it is the easiest solution to bypassing 
device encryption. However, technology companies face scrutiny from a U.S. customer 
base concerned with privacy, and technology encryption advocates who view these 
concessions as weakening the security of devices. As a result, the issue is not easily 
overcome.  
While policy professionals and the private sector debate the proper landscape for 
this answer, advances in encryption continue, and law enforcement organizations struggle 
to keep up with the number of devices seized for forensic examination that cannot be 
accessed. Moreover, in some cases, encryption enhancements are occurring outside the 
walls of major technology companies, which the government typically engages in the 
debate. The ease and cost of manufacturing devices and applications allows for 
encryption enhancements that may not include U.S.-based companies subject to 
agreements or legislation. Even if a resolution with information technology companies is 
achieved, the United States is in need of a policy solution to this encrypted reality from 
which law enforcement is able to operate.  
In part, because so many prominent technology and communications companies 
are located in the United States, an expectation exists that an encryption policy will be 
                                                 
6 Robert Chesney and Steve Vladeck, “A Coherent Middle Ground in the Apple—FBI All Writs Act 
Dispute,” Lawfare (blog), March 21, 2016, https://lawfareblog.com/coherent-middle-ground-apple-fbi-all-
writs-act-dispute.  
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pioneered in this country. However, despite holding hearings on the issue to address 
reforms to laws like the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
(CALEA), federal legislators have been unable to reach a satisfactory agreement on a 
path forward. Meanwhile, representatives from private industry have made it clear they 
may no longer be interested in assisting U.S. law enforcement.  
The issue of data encryption, at rest and in motion, is not exclusive to the United 
States. The location and transmission of data have few boundaries in the cyber realm. 
Countries like China and Israel appear to have two different approaches they are already 
exercising. In China, a counterterrorism law recently passed mandating the support and 
assistance of telecommunications and internet service providers to support the security 
activities of the country.7 This approach differs slightly from Israel, which requires 
companies with encryption technology to submit to initial regulatory requirements, but 
does not appear to impose anything further on them down the road.8 Some have 
speculated that the more lenient Israeli laws along with the cultural norms of the country 
allow for technological development and a willingness of cutting-edge companies to 
voluntarily assist the government.9 This thesis examines the different paths these 
countries have taken to grapple with the common challenge in search of lessons that 
could help advance the U.S. debate about encryption toward a more optimal resolution.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Given the need for a solution to the encryption debate in the United States, do the 
policy options of China or Israel offer models to address the issue of access to encrypted 
devices effectively and reasonably in the U.S. context?  
                                                 
7 Zunyou Zhou, “China’s Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Law,” The Diplomat, January 23, 2016, 
https://www.uschina.org/china-hub/unofficial-translation-counter-terrorism-law-peoples-republic-china; 
“Counter-Terrorism Law (2015),” China Law Translate, accessed April 3, 2017, http:// www.chinalaw 
translate.com/反恐怖主义法-（2015）/?lang=en. 
8 “Encryption Controls in Israel,” Israeli Ministry of Defense, accessed April 1, 2017, http://www. 
mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/default.aspx. 
9 Matthew Waxman and Doron Hindin, “How Does Israel Regulate Encryption,” Lawfare (blog), 
November 30, 2015, https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-does-israel-regulate-encryption. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
University of Virginia Professor Ashley Deeks states, “It is possible to treat 
encryption as predominantly a rights question, a law enforcement question, an 
intelligence question, an economic question, or an export control question.”10 Most 
literature reviewed more commonly frames encryption as a battle between the right to 
privacy and the right of the government to exceptional access. This literature review 
assesses relevant scholarly policy material on this latter debate.  
The analysis of the available non-technical literature is separated into distinct 
categories based on the content of the material. The first section deals with literature that 
gives a broad description of encryption and the privacy versus exceptional access debate, 
which has endured largely below the surface of popular media since the 1990s. This 
section includes the classification of those things considered capable of encryption, 
namely information at rest and information in transit, as well as the positions staked in a 
debate with roots many decades old. As a result, the literature reviewed spans this same 
timeframe in an effort to understand the lack of progress on the topic.  
The second section assesses the areas within scholarly material in support of 
greater government access. This subject matter speaks to the position of law enforcement 
and intelligence community proponents who advocate for exceptional access to deter and 
investigate criminal actors and terrorists who may utilize encryption for illicit purposes. 
The third section describes arguments supporting unfettered encryption and opposing 
special government access. The point of view maintained by this group ranges from 
privacy advocates fearful of government intrusion to technology advocates fearful of 
weakened encryption.  
The last section assesses the literature that focuses on the policies of Israel and 
China. These two countries have implemented different policies without waiting for the 
United States to act. Further, a review of literature involving encryption in these two 
                                                 
10 Ashley Deeks, “The International Legal Dynamics of Encryption,” Lawfare (blog), 1, October 12, 
2016, https://www.lawfareblog.com/international-legal-dynamics-encryption.  
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countries presents an opportunity to apply the lessons learned to the United States. Their 
application to the United States in present literature lacks exploration in research to date.  
1. Encryption and the Debate  
Encryption is the coded protection of information in the cyber universe accessible 
only to those with the appropriate keys to view that data. It is used to protect information, 
both lawful and illicit. As discussed informally in the problem statement, scholars agree 
that encryption is the use of cryptography to protect information existing in two forms, 
real-time communications and stored communications. Harvard researchers describe the 
two types as end-to-end encryption and device encryption.11 Device encryption is the 
target of this literature review and thesis.  
All the reviewed material acknowledges that every effort should be made to have 
the highest level of encryption to protect information adequately. Former FBI Director 
James Comey, who was at center of the government’s position on going dark, publicly 
stated, “The development and robust adoption of strong encryption is a key tool. …We 
support and encourage the use of secure networks … so as to promote our overall 
safety.”12 Cyber scholars representing the view of those in opposition to exceptional 
access also support this notion, stating there is a “fundamental technical importance of 
strong cryptography.”13 The importance and commitment to encryption is clearly 
undisputed by the parties on either side of the debate.  
Regardless of the types of information or importance of encryption, the literature 
frames an important debate on the issue. While the latest foray into encryption surfaced 
in mainstream media over the past few years, heavy analysis of positions on encryption 
                                                 
11 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, Don’t Panic, Making Progress on 
the “Going Dark” Debate (Cambridge, MA: Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard 
University, 2016), 4, https://cyber.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-panic/Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_ 
Going_Dark_Debate.pdf. 
12 “Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balance between Public Safety and Privacy,” United 
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, July 8, 2015, http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/going-
dark-encryption-technology-and-the-balance-between-public-safety-and-privacy.  
13 Harold Abelson et al., “Keys under Doormats: Mandating Insecurity by Requiring Government 
Access to All Data and Communications,” Journal of Cybersecurity, November 17, 2015, 7, doi: 10.1093/ 
cybsec/tyv009.  
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had occurred before, in the 1990s. In all literature, it has generally been accepted that it is 
not a new issue, but instead is a perpetual debate.14 A Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) examination of the issue states, “The tension between the benefits and challenges 
of encryption is not new. It started in the 1990s and was reinvigorated in 2014.”15 In his 
comparison of the encryption issue in the 1990s and present day, Matthias Schulze says 
that  
the discursive positions in the two discourses [Clipper and Apple vs. FBI] 
are somewhat similar. Law enforcement (FBI), intelligence actors (NSA) 
and politicians (predominantly, but not exclusively conservatives) argue 
for governmental regulation or encryption and providing exceptional 
access for legitimate law enforcement inquiries. In both discourses this 
group produces a relatively homogeneous set of arguments. Technology 
companies, cryptography experts, scientists and a mix of civil-libertarians 
and tech enthusiasts argue for widespread, public use of encryption. This 
group is more heterogeneous and uses a variety of arguments. In both 
instances, there is a middle ground, recognizing the needs of both groups 
and arguing for a compromise.16 
These respective positions and their arguments are explored in the next sections.  
2. A Position for Exceptional Access 
The literature on encryption reveals many government officials, especially those 
within law enforcement, maintain the perspective that unlimited encryption is 
unreasonable. This viewpoint is one side of the debate. These advocates for exceptional 
access articulate a need for a solution to the issue. Some on this side argue that it should 
be regulatory in nature. Former FBI Director Comey states, “The Department of Justice 
believes that the challenges posed by the Going Dark problem are grave, growing, and 
extremely complex. We believe we will need to pursue multiple paths [for a solution].”17 
                                                 
14 See Abelson et al. who, in their analysis on the subject, state that the Crypto Wars began in the 
1970s, and in many ways, are the same now as they were in the 1990s. 
15 Kristin Kinklea, Richard M. Thompson II, and Chris Jaikaran, Court-Ordered Access to Smart 
Phones: In Brief, CRS Report No. R44396 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 1, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44396.pdf.  
16 Matthias Schulze, “Clipper Meets Apple vs. FBI-A Comparison of the Cryptography Discourses 
from 1993 and 2016,” Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439) 5, no. 1 (March 2017): 56–57, http:// 
www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/view/805/805.  
17 United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “Going Dark.” 
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Chairman McCaul of the House Committee on Homeland Security stated to an audience 
at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “Congress has to have a solution to this. There should 
be international standards and norms, just as there should be with cybersecurity.”18 The 
argument of government officials is that an inability to access this information could 
prevent the deterrence of terrorist attacks or investigation into suspects following 
criminal acts.  
The rationale for the mindset of those in law enforcement who favor a 
government-brokered approach can be traced to the crutch offered by the CALEA passed 
in 1994. One of law enforcement’s most valuable tools in an investigation is their ability 
to listen to telephone communications by “tapping” phone lines following appropriate 
judicial authorization. In the 1980s and 1990s, telephonic system upgrades included 
moving from simple-to-tap copper connections to more impenetrable fiber-optics. Law 
enforcement sought solutions to the interception of these enhanced telephonic 
communications, commonly known as Title III wiretaps. Ultimately, they relied on 
legislation to compel telecommunications companies to assist. CALEA outlines the 
requirements for telecommunications companies to cooperate with the government in the 
interception of communications following proper authorization from the courts.19  
Following the passage of CALEA and the advent of enhanced communication 
through the internet, the government called for alterations that would provide a similar 
solution of exceptional access. Internet service providers (ISPs) are not included within 
CALEA. According to Abelson et al., “Claiming that widespread encryption would be 
disastrous for law enforcement, the U.S. government proposed the use of the Clipper 
Chip, an encryption device that contained a government master key to give the 
government access to encrypted communications.”20 This government-based solution and 
other attempts were eventually abandoned due to pressure from the technology industry 
                                                 
18 “Putting in a Back Door Isn’t the Solution’ to Encryption Debate,” U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
September 27, 2016, https://www.uschamber.com/article/putting-back-door-isn-t-the-solution-encryption-
debate.  
19 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Public Law 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279, H.R. 
4922 (1994). 
20 Abelson et al., “Keys under Doormats,” 5.  
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and the European Union.21 Matthias Schulze states, “The general argument put forward 
by critics…is that the government should look at the bigger picture, recognizing the 
general interest of the people and corporations that need encryption, both for privacy 
reasons but also for business interests and data security.”22 He concludes that the 
arguments that defeated the Clipper Chip in the 1990s will ultimately prevail in defeating 
those in favor of exceptional access in the wake of the Apple versus FBI debate today.23  
After the Clipper Chip episode, law enforcement and intelligence agencies found 
other solutions, some of which were described in documents released by Edward 
Snowden.24 However, following the Snowden disclosures and advances in technology, 
literature reveals that law enforcement and intelligence agencies are facing renewed 
challenges with indications that the solution the government is seeking comes in a form 
that resembles the ease of access afforded by CALEA. In 2012, former FBI Director 
Mueller testified in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the matter of 
communication on the internet, “What we are seeking is the ability to enforce that [court] 
order and be able to obtain those communications [transmitted over the Internet], and 
what we are looking at is some form of legislation.”25 More recently, Director Comey 
was quoted as saying, “We aren’t seeking a back-door approach. We want to use the front 
door, with clarity and transparency, and with clear guidance provided by law.”26 Even 
some legal scholars, like Richard Posner, who sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals in the 
Seventh Circuit, has said, “My inclination—it is only that; I am not an expert in these 
matters—would be to let the NSA have its back door.”27 Literature highlighting 
                                                 
21 Abelson et al., 5; Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 66. 
22 Schulze, “Clipper Meets Apple vs. FBI-A Comparison of the Cryptography Discourses from 1993 
and 2016,” 58.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Steven M. Bellovin et al., “Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping on the 
Internet,” Northwestern Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property 12, no. 1 (2014): 11–12, http://scho 
larlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol12/iss1/1. 
25 “Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,” United States Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, May 16, 2012, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=709470.  
26 Abelson et al., “Keys under Doormats,” 5. 
27 Richard Posner, “Digital Fortress,” Lessig, August 26, 2004, http://www.lessig.org/2004/08/digital-
fortress/. 
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advocates’ points of view to exceptional access is clear. A solution that compels private 
industry’s assistance in gaining access is necessary, but the way in which it is achieved 
remains undefined.  
Former FBI Director Comey described a path forward that includes continuing the 
debate on the issue, observing the privacy rights of citizens, factoring in the international 
community, and developing novel tools and techniques to address encryption.28 
However, former Director Comey’s talking points are not a solution. Some law 
enforcement advocates proposed a solution of key escrow, or the secure, third party 
storage of master keys for authorized decryption, when encryption first became a 
significant issue of debate in the 1990s.29 This position has largely not changed, and at 
that time, experts deemed it an unworthy solution.  
Meanwhile, many privacy advocates and cryptography experts who take a 
contrary position, arguing vehemently against exceptional access, do propose that 
solution. The next section reviews the literature opposing exceptional access and presents 
alternative encryption policy directions. 
3. A Position in Opposition to Exceptional Access 
The other side of the coin in the encryption debate is articulated in a number of 
documents generated by privacy advocates, security experts, and legal scholars. Their 
research is supported and published by respected institutions like Harvard, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), and Northwestern. Within the literature reviewed, authors 
oppose exceptional access on multiple levels, with some extending beyond the position of 
privacy. Summarizing the literature on the issue, the arguments are: (1) a fundamental 
right to privacy is a priority, (2) regulation of exceptional access may lead to increased 
vulnerabilities, and (3) regulation may prove to be useless since the bounds of encryption 
will never be defined, and those nefarious characters desiring encryption will just seek it 
                                                 
28 United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “Going Dark.”  




from those providing it outside of regulated U.S. companies. These arguments are more 
fully discussed in the following paragraphs.  
Privacy is central to the encryption argument. Generally speaking, it is a 
fundamental right in the United States articulated throughout the Constitution, including 
the Fourth and Fifth amendments.30 Specific to encryption, legal scholar Ashley Deeks, 
references a report from David Kaye, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
protection and promotion of the right to freedom of opinion and expression that states, 
“Encryption and anonymity…create a zone of privacy to protect opinion and belief.”31 
This report is in reference to the importance of encryption to certain groups of people, 
especially political activists in countries with authoritarian regimes. Even advocates of 
exceptional access acknowledge the importance of privacy in the encryption debate. In 
his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, former FBI Director James Comey 
says, “it is our obligation to uphold civil liberties, including the right to privacy…the 
fundamental right of people to engage in private communications, regardless of the 
medium or technology.”32  
Researchers, in literature released by MIT, state that as a result of government 
regulated encryption for the purposes of access, an increasing number of vulnerabilities 
to encryption will result with the requirement to maintain encryption keys, increased 
complexity in systems, and at least one known point of access.33 Much of the literature 
supports their present day arguments through references to a vulnerability exploited 
during the telephone switch era. Several pieces refer to the Athens Affair, in which a 
weakness in a phone switch designed for government wiretapping was exploited that 
                                                 
30 U.S. Const. amend. IV and V. 
31 David Kaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, United Nations Human Rights Council, 29th sess., agenda item 3, 5, 
May 22, 2015.  
32 United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “Going Dark.” 
33 Abelson et al., “Keys under Doormats,” 1–2. 
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allowed unauthorized individuals to access telephone communications of high-level 
government officials in Greece.34  
With regards to limiting encryption, Lawrence Lessig states, “From the very start 
of the debate over the government’s control of encryption, techies have argued that such 
regulations are silly. Code can always be exported; bits know no borders.”35 One Indian 
researcher has remarked, “[W]riting a new encrypted app is not exactly rocket science 
and switching over to apps made in other countries without restrictive regulations will be 
child’s play.”36 Harvard researchers take the argument about encryption a step further 
and claim that the “going dark” debate is a misnomer. They claim that although the 
government is certainly losing some access to information with the implementation of 
enhanced encryption on some services, the expanded internet of things (IoT) is actually 
providing greater means of surveillance, not less.37  
That being said, those in opposition to exceptional access do think a need exists 
for law enforcement to gain access to encrypted devices and communications. In 
Congressional testimony, Susan Landau says, “Law enforcement is entirely correct that it 
has a problem….I agree that with the new communications technologies, there is a need 
for law enforcement access.”38 Their perception to how this access is achieved differs 
from most exceptional access advocates.  
The solution to exceptional access proposed by many encryption advocates boils 
down to law enforcement and intelligence community responsibility. These authors argue 
that the onus is on those agencies to overcome their perceived problem with exceptional 
access. Cyber-security expert Bruce Schneier, in commenting about the FBI’s fight with 
                                                 
34 Abelson et al., 17; Vassilis Prevalakis and Diomidis Spinellis, “The Athens Affair,” Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineering Spectrum, June 29, 2007, http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/ 
the-athens-affair. 
35 Lessig, Code: Version 2.0, 1. 
36 Ashish Gupta, The Encryption Dilemma: Combating the Scourge of Terrorism whilst Balancing 
Civil Rights and National Security (New Delhi: Centre for Air Power Studies, Forum for National Security 
Studies, 2016), http://capsindia.org/files/documents/CAPS_Infocus_AG_14.pdf. 
37 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, Don’t Panic, 15. 
38 Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies, House of 
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary (February 17, 2011) (statement of Susan Landau), http://jud 
iciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Landau02172011.pdf. 
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Apple to gain access to the phone of a terrorist in San Bernardino states, “The FBI did the 
right thing by using an existing vulnerability rather than forcing Apple to create a new 
one.”39 Researchers supported by Northwestern make similar comments in their work 
claiming, “We are suggesting use of pre-existing vulnerabilities for lawful access to 
communications.”40 Those researchers go as far as to say that such a method will always 
be necessary since the technology behind internet communications is non-traditional, and 
unlike the uniformity found in telecommunications, it will always be possible that an 
encrypted technology will exist outside of one governed by a CALEA-like law.41 Susan 
Hennessey of Brookings states, “Lawful hacking is a necessary, though possibly not 
sufficient, element of a workable solution without mandated exceptional access. [It] 
should be viewed as the central element of a comprehensive alternative strategy.”42  
4. A Middle Ground Solution? 
The literature reviewed typically favors one side of the debate or the other. Little 
scholarly research supports a viable middle ground solution. The administration under 
President Obama recognized the conflict between the two sides described previously. 
During the South by Southwest Festival in 2016, President Obama stated, “My 
conclusion so far is that you cannot take an absolutist view on this.”43 
Hoaithi Nguyen, a graduate of the Center for Homeland Defense and Security at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, attempted to advance the debate over encryption towards 
concrete policy proposals in her award winning thesis, “Lawful Hacking: Toward a 
Middle Ground Solution to the Going Dark Problem.” Nguyen concludes, “Congress 
                                                 
39 Bruce Schneier, “Lawful Hacking,” Schneier on Security (blog), March 2016, https://www.schneier. 
com/blog/archives/2016/03/lawful_hacking_.html. 
40 Bellovin et al., “Lawful Hacking,” 27. 
41 Bellovin et al., 30. 
42 Susan Hennessey, “Lawful Hacking and the Case for a Strategic Approach to ‘Going Dark,’” 
Brookings, October 7, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/research/lawful-hacking-and-the-case-for-a-
strategic-approach-to-going-dark/.  




must act.”44 She states, “I recommend that policy makers adopt legislative actions to 
legalize and thereby legitimize hacking by law enforcement in limited cases as a middle-
ground solution.”45 Nguyen discusses conducting ethical hacking with a lawful warrant 
that satisfies Fourth Amendment requirements in concert with minimizing procedures and 
a transparency requirement. She describes this requirement as, “preferable to mandating 
exceptional access.”46 However, Nguyen does not articulate what new concrete 
legislative actions, if any, should be undertaken to achieve this middle ground goal.  
5. Beyond the Borders of the United States: China and Israel  
The issue of encryption is not endemic to the United States. Other countries in the 
world, like Canada, are standing by waiting for policy decisions to be made in the United 
States, as they did with CALEA, by piggybacking on the outcome of the debate.47 
Literature indicates that two countries, China and Israel, moved beyond the debate and 
established policies on the issue of encryption that fit the values and cultures of their 
respective governments and those in the population supporting that government. A 
review of this literature also reveals that prior efforts have not been taken to apply the 
lessons learned in those countries to the issue of device encryption in the United States.  
a. China 
Hoover Institute researcher Adam Segal’s historical analysis in China, Encryption 
Policy, and International Influence describes forceful efforts through the State 
Encryption Management Bureau to regulate and legislate encryption. Efforts started in 
the late 1990s and most recently culminated with the passage of China’s 2016 counter-
                                                 
44 Hoaithi Y. T. Nguyen, “Lawful Hacking: Toward a Middle Ground Solution to the Going Dark 
Problem” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 79, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=80 
0928. 
45 Nguyen, 75.  
46 Nguyen, 75. 
47 Matthew Braga, “Why Canada Isn’t Having a Policy Debate over Encryption,” The Globe and Mail, 
February 23, 2016, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/why-canada-isnt-having-a-rigorous-
debate-over-encryption/article28859991/. 
 15 
terrorism law on the issue.48 The government initially took aim at encryption and early 
draft versions indicated a requirement for backdoor access and the filing of encryption 
solutions. However, this approach ultimately changed. According to Bloomberg News, 
“[The law] that takes effect in June 2017 requires Internet operators to cooperate with 
investigations involving crime and national security, and imposes mandatory testing and 
certification of computer equipment. Companies must also give government investigators 
full access to their data if wrong-doing is suspected.”49 In the law that passed, Segal 
states that the foreign community welcomed the exclusion of backdoor and encryption 
solution requirements, but, “The wording of Article 18 [of the 2016 counter-terrorism 
act] seems to leave local and state authorities with ‘broad discretionary authority to 
require companies to provide access to their equipment and decryption support in 
particular cases.’”50 
Although China faced some criticism for this law from foreign governments and 
companies, Segal points out, “The importance of the Chinese market to current revenues 
and future growth may lead [foreign] firms to fork their technologies, creating different 
products for different markets.”51 Domestic companies, like Huawei and Xiaomi, are also 
described as being increasingly reliant on the Chinese government’s support for future 
growth.52 The authors’ descriptions indicate that China’s decision is a feasible course of 
action, values and human rights notwithstanding.  
b. Israel  
Israel’s encryption laws were established decades ago under Israel’s Ministry of 
Defense. Attorneys Matthew Waxman and Doron Hindin provide one of the only critical 
                                                 
48 Adam Segal, “China, Encryption Policy, and International Influence,” Lawfare (blog), 2, December 
14, 2016, https://www.lawfareblog.com/china-encryption-policy-and-international-influence. 
49 Bloomberg News Staff, “China Adopts Cybersecurity Law despite Foreign Opposition,” Bloomberg 
News, November 7, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-07/china-passes-cybersecur 
ity-law-despite-strong-foreign-opposition. 
50 Paul D. McKenzie, Gordon A. Milner, and Wei Zhang, “China’s Anti-Terrorism Law Raises Data 
Security Concerns,” Lexology, January 20, 2016, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=705429 
e6-d560-4ef9-a415-d34650f3629c; Segal, “China, Encryption Policy, and International Influence,” 5.  
51 Segal, 8. 
52 Segal, 9.  
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analyses of the evolution of Israeli encryption policy and the advantages it provides to the 
state and information technology firms. According to the attorneys: 
Israel has adopted a much farther-reaching regulatory system that 
effectively governs all forms of “engagement in encryption”... At the same 
time, the Israeli encryption control mechanisms operate without directly 
legislating any form of encryption-key depositories, built-in back or front 
door access points, or other similar requirements. Instead, Israel’s system 
emphasizes smooth initial licensing processes and cultivates government-
private sector collaboration. These processes help ensure that Israeli 
authorities are apprised of the latest encryption and cyber developments 
and position the government to engage effectively with the private sector 
when national security risks are identified.53 
In its governance of all forms of engagement with encryption, the regulatory 
system in Israel shares similarities with China. The authors explain that the system also 
affords licensing exemptions, rarely includes direct enforcement, and ultimately, allows 
for enhanced private sector collaboration with the government.54 One argument raised in 
the literature is, “An approach that simply mandated all companies deposit encryption 
keys or create concealed access points would probably undermine this initial dialogue.”55  
The authors do broach an important topic within their analysis that focuses on the 
socio-cultural differences of Israel from other countries. The government’s close ties with 
its businesses are often rooted in the compulsory military service completed by the 
owners of these companies. Further, once established, these businesses often recruit 
individuals who have excelled in the intelligence and technology sectors of the military. 
The authors suggest that the lack of an encryption issue in Israel may be the result of a 
close, working relationship between the government and private sector encouraged by the 
regulatory practices of the Ministry of Defense. However, they also imply that the socio-
cultural norms of the country “facilitate an encryption regime that operates less out of 
tough enforcement and more through dialogue and mutual assistance between private 
tech companies and government national security entities.”56 As a result, encryption 
                                                 
53 Waxman and Hindin, “How Does Israel Regulate Encryption.”  
54 Waxman and Hindin.  
55 Waxman and Hindin.  
56 Waxman and Hindin. 
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technology has flourished in Israel, and in 2014, it was estimated that the country sold 
10% of the global encryption and cyber technologies.57  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The United States has been engaged in an encryption debate for at least 25 
years.58 Law enforcement leaders tout a solution in which Silicon Valley companies 
come to the assistance of the U.S. government.59 On the other side of the argument, 
privacy and technology advocates favor a solution generated at the hands of law 
enforcement.60 By all appearances, the quest for a solution is perpetual. A policy gap 
exists to address the issue while technological devices with encrypted data that may hold 
evidence stack up in local law enforcement agencies unable to be accessed.61 Meanwhile, 
private enterprises continue to develop devices and technology that utilize encryption, to 
which advances are being made at a rapid rate. Some countries have accepted this 
situation as reality and have moved unilaterally to address the issue.  
This thesis closely examines the policies of Israel and China because, unlike the 
United States, both countries have defined approaches to addressing device encryption 
and these countries lack the public discourse that would otherwise indicate a lack of 
agreement for their respective approaches. Further, the basis for their approaches mirrors 
the two sides of the U.S. encryption debate, one favoring structure and resources, and the 
other, a legal mandate. Given these characteristics, these countries offer policy models 
relevant to the development of a U.S. domestic solution. The goal of this thesis is to 
evaluate the disparate policies established by the Israeli and Chinese governments in an 
effort to glean lessons and potential solutions for a path forward on the issue of device 
encryption in the United States.  
                                                 
57 Waxman and Hindin.  
58 Abelson et al., “Keys under Doormats,” 5.  
59 United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “Going Dark.” 
60 Hennessey, “Lawful Hacking and the Case for a Strategic Approach to ‘Going Dark.’” 
61 Cyrus Vance Jr., “5 Ways Tech Companies Distort the Encryption Debate,” Washington Post, 
December 15, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/12/15/5-things-tech-
companies-dont-understand-about-encryption/?utm_term=.7dbd0282166f. 
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The thesis examines the historical development and current encryption policy on 
data at rest in Israel and China using available information in literature. It evaluates the 
policies using qualitative analysis to assess indicators of legality, cost, political 
acceptance, and potential for success of each model’s application within the United 
States. In assessing the respective policies for legality, this thesis evaluates the 
constitutional and legal implications for implementation. Cost is assessed on two levels, 
the anticipated impact on government expenditures and repercussions for U.S. 
businesses. Political acceptance of the policies is evaluated on the expected reception of 
two groups, the legislative branch and the U.S. population. In assessing the policies for 
the potential for success, this thesis evaluates the effectiveness of the respective 
approaches in two areas, resolving the exceptional access debate and the probability of 
law enforcement to obtain usable data from a device that uses encryption.  
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The goal of the thesis is to present policy recommendations in the United States 
relative to device encryption that can serve as a means to end the current debate on the 
subject. Chapter I presents the problem statement, research question, and reviews the 
relevant literature on the subject. Chapter II provides a brief history of encryption, the 
genesis of the debate, and examines the issue of device encryption and the rationale for 
the necessity of a solution. Chapters III and IV provide background to the policies of 
Israel and China, respectively. Chapter V evaluates the respective approaches of the two 
countries using qualitative analysis to assess indicators of legality, cost, political 
acceptance, and potential for success in the context of an U.S. implementation. Chapter 
VI contains conclusions and recommendations based on the results of the previous 
chapters’ policy analyses.  
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II. ENCRYPTION AND ITS CHALLENGE TO LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
Apple and Google came out with these softwares [sic] that I can no longer 
be [un]encrypted by the police... [i]f our phone[s are] running on iOS8 
software, they can’t open my phone. This may be [a]nother gift from 
God.62 
—Defendant on a Recorded Prison Phone 
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office 
 
That is not a gift from God, but an unintended gift from two of the largest 
technology companies in the world.63  
—Cyrus Vance, Jr., 
District Attorney for Manhattan 
 
The focus of this thesis is on the device encryption approaches of foreign 
countries to provide recommendations for potential solutions to the problems law 
enforcement agencies face in the United States. Prior to assessing these policies and 
providing recommendations, a general discussion on encryption and the mounting 
problems facing law enforcement will be instructive to the reader. The encryption debate 
from the government’s point of view commonly revolves around intelligence agencies 
and their inability to intercept communications. A compelling theoretical argument is that 
this inability will lead to a catastrophic terrorist attack within the United States that may 
otherwise be stopped with exceptional access to encrypted communications. This thesis 
does not argue that it is not a possibility; it is an important issue for intelligence agencies. 
However, the volume of devices with inaccessible data seized by local, state, and federal 
                                                 
62 United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, Written Testimony of New York County 
District Attorney Cyrus R. Vance, Jr. before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 
‘Cybersecurity and U.S. National Security,’ Washington, D.C., July 14, 2016 (Washington, DC: United 
States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 2016), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/ 
doc/Vance_07-14-16.pdf. 
63 United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. 
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law enforcement in criminal cases on a daily basis is concrete and growing in size each 
year.  
This chapter establishes a common launching point for the discourse to follow. 
What is device encryption, how did we get to this point, why is it that it has turned into 
an unending debate, and is the issue really as insurmountable as government experts lead 
people to believe? Understanding the answers to these questions is the first step in 
moving towards a solution.  
This chapter starts with a brief history on device encryption to familiarize readers 
on a subject that can otherwise be considered esoteric. While the technical aspects behind 
encryption are complex and are not the subject of this thesis, a discussion of 
fundamentals through its evolution does hold value. The fact that encryption is inherently 
vulnerable to being defeated becomes evident with such an examination. The chapter 
then moves to a short conversation about the initial encryption debate and significant 
historical markers since that time to set the foundation for present-day issues. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with the challenges facing U.S. law enforcement. Establishing the 
tangible problem of device encryption to law enforcement in the United States prompts 
the obvious questions of does this issue occur elsewhere in the world? If so, how is it that 
other countries have chosen to tackle it? These questions are only obvious if the problem 
of device encryption is properly illustrated as a concern in the United States. 
A. DEVICE ENCRYPTION BACKGROUND  
In the United States, 95% of Americans own a cell phone and 77% of those 
cellular devices are smartphones.64 The companies manufacturing these devices and 
accompanying operating systems of the phones, like Apple and Google, are focusing on 
protecting the information contained on the devices. An effort is being made to appeal to 
their customers’ desires for security and privacy. These companies accomplish this task 
using encryption.  
                                                 
64 Pew Research Center, “Mobile Fact Sheet.”  
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On a superficial level, device encryption is an integrated process involving the 
device’s hardware and software, and is initiated when the device is locked. When locked, 
the device’s operating system then applies a mathematical algorithm to the data on the 
mobile device that alters the data’s appearance and renders much of the user’s 
information stored on the phone unreadable in the form of a cipher. The process is 
reversed when the device is unlocked. The unlocking procedure is initiated with the 
application of a key, typically activated by a numeric or alpha-numeric passcode, or 
biometric feature. It should be noted that the owner of the device, in addition to anyone 
else who has the knowledge of the passcode or has ability to crack the key that unlocks 
the device, can successfully complete the unlocking procedure.  
As a result of encryption, data residing on a device cannot be usefully accessed 
unless it is decrypted. While encryption can be applied to information at rest or in 
motion, device encryption is limited to this data at rest. As previously discussed, this 
thesis focuses on the encryption of the data on a device at the most basic level; that is to 
say, a locked device utilizing encryption. However, this data at rest can be further 
delineated to describe data on a locked device beyond the applications installed by the 
manufacturer in the factory settings, and can include third-party applications, and in most 
cases, backup images of the device found on cloud storage services. Recognition of these 
additional characteristics is important to a fuller understanding of the encryption issue, 
but the conversation is moot if the device is locked and the information within it, 
encrypted. Equally important to a discussion about device encryption policy is gaining a 
better historical perspective to understand the central issue of this thesis and persistent 
vulnerabilities of encryption itself. 
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ENCRYPTION 
Device encryption is part of the evolution of cryptography, which is developed to 
secure electronic communications and information. The goal of cryptography has always 
been to hide a communication without allowing that communication to betray its 
meaning. The hope is that the cipher is strong enough to prevent decryption in a 
reasonable amount of time. However, history illustrates that methods of cryptography, 
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with few exceptions, have always been defeated. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman, in their 
landmark paper on encryption, state, “Experience has shown, however, that few systems 
can resist the concerted attack of skillful cryptoanalysts, and many supposedly secure 
systems have subsequently been broken.”65 For this reason, the history of encryption is 
an important backdrop to this thesis. A historical analysis illuminates the vulnerabilities 
of encryption at almost every intersection in its evolution.  
The Caesar Cipher, dating to 58 B.C., is the first reported use of a systematic, 
mathematical method to mask the symbols used in communications for the purposes of 
security. Julius Caesar used a simple substitution cipher in his correspondence to 
preclude unauthorized individuals from reading it. This practice of uniformly shifting all 
letters of a document up or down a predetermined number of letters within an alphabet 
was used for hundreds of years to defeat prying eyes. This rudimentary method of 
secrecy was overcome through something called frequency analysis. In 800 A.D., a 
mathematician named al Kindi developed the concept of frequency analysis to decipher 
messages.66 He postulated that letters of a language appear within a given text at a set 
percentage. By applying that percentage to text using a substitution cipher, the shift can 
be determined, which effectively cracks the cipher.  
Following the exploited weakness of the substitution cipher, the polyalphabetic 
cipher met the needs of those seeking to advance their ability to conceal the content of 
messages. This method, attributed to Leon Battista Alberti in 1467, relies on multiple 
shifts within an alphabet to secrete the content. One common way to execute this cipher 
is to use a key word known only to the sender and recipient. The key word coordinates 
the shift within the alphabet in the message. This type of cipher was still susceptible to 
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frequency analysis and could be cracked after finding repeated series of letters in the 
text.67  
Regardless of the weakness of the polyalphabetic cypher, for 400 years, it was the 
method of choice for strong cryptography. It was not until random shifts were introduced 
that the evolution of cryptography was furthered. By choosing shifts at random, between 
one and 26, cryptographers achieved uniform frequency distribution and a lack of 
repetition. Each letter being encrypted could be one of 26 choices to make brute force 
attempts to hack a message almost impossible. Each letter in a message could have 26 
possibilities; thus, a word longer than one letter would have an unpredictable sequence 
that grows exponentially by a factor of 26 for each new letter.68 The method by which 
this cipher was passed was through a one-time pad to which both the sender and receiver 
of a message had access. Frequency analysis proved useless and it ultimately became a 
precursor for the Enigma Machine, a rotor encryption machine used by the Germans in 
World War I to share strategic messages by automating this one-time pad.  
The means by which the Enigma functioned could be a thesis unto itself, and the 
one-time pad basis for it was studied extensively. In 1945, Claude Shannon provided 
mathematical proof that the one-time pad was perfectly secret in a comprehensive 
classified paper on the subject that was made public in 1949.69 At a high level, the 
Enigma contained four rotors numbered one to 26 that could be set up to elicit millions of 
different possibilities in the encryption of messages. The Allies cracked the machine 
when they developed a machine called the Bombe that could test hundreds of thousands 
of rotor settings in seconds. Their efforts were successful not because of a failure of the 
one-time pad, but a combination of human errors to include biased decision-making 
amongst Enigma operators, the recovery of codebooks from a German U-Boat, and an 
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engineering flaw in the construction of the machine itself.70 This ability to crack a 
cryptographic code by exploiting something other than the code itself is an important 
theme that transcends methods of encryption and is discussed later in this thesis.  
This is not to say the one-time pad was infallible. Multiple problems with it have 
resulted, including the need for it to be lengthy for it to be successful. It also required that 
two parties had to exchange physically the key to be used to decrypt the message. As the 
name infers, a one-time pad can only be used one time and a new key must be developed 
and exchanged for each use. Some of these challenges were overcome with the advent of 
computing power and the evolution of technology. Following World War II, finance and 
defense sectors drove rapid advances in cryptography and helped usher in modern 
encryption. The Cold War between the United States and Russia triggered an arms race 
along with commensurate defensive measures. Within these means to counter-assault 
attacks were computerized radar stations that communicated their information to military 
command centers. Meanwhile, banks became reliant on computers to track and store 
financial information. Financial transfers once made in person began to occur more 
frequently domestically using phone lines, and internationally through submarine cables. 
The banking and defense industries relied on security within their computers and 
networked communications. Encryption of these devices and their communications were 
of paramount concern and became the focus of academia.  
In 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, in their paper, New Directions in 
Cryptography, developed a way to allow for encryption and decryption without requiring 
the physical exchange of a key. According to Diffie and Hellman, “In order to use 
cryptography to insure privacy, however, it is currently necessary for communicating 
parties to share a key which is known to no one else. The cost and delay imposed by this 
key distribution problem is a major barrier to the transfer of business communications to 
large teleprocessing networks.”71 Using an algorithm based on discrete logarithmic 
functions of prime numbers, Diffie and Hellman illustrated the idea of a public key 
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exchange that could be used to establish privacy and authentication of anyone 
communicating by way of computers, which is now known as the Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange. Their use of algorithms in encryption is the basis for cryptographic methods 
used on modern-day devices.  
Contemporaneous to Diffie and Hellman’s efforts, the U.S. National Bureau of 
Standards recognized the same need for the government to protect information on 
computers that the researchers addressed for businesses and non-governmental entities. 
They sought a cipher that would adequately protect this information. A team from IBM 
pioneered what eventually became known as the data encryption standard (DES) that was 
adopted by the U.S. government in 1976. According to the Federal Information 
Processing Standards Publication, “The Data Encryption Standard specifies an algorithm 
to be implemented in electronic hardware devices and used for the cryptographic 
protection of computer data...the algorithm described in this standard specifies both 
enciphering and deciphering operations which are based on a binary number called a 
key…the key consists of 64 binary digits [or bits].”72 The encryption space, or possible 
combinations for the correct key, consists of over 70 quadrillion options.73 However, in 
the 1990s, it was publicly revealed that DES could be cracked in a brute-force attack in 
under a day’s time.74  
In 2002, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
introduced the advanced encryption standard (AES). It was described as, “A symmetric 
block cipher that can encrypt and decrypt information…The AES algorithm is capable of 
using cryptographic keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits to encrypt and decrypt data in blocks 
of 128 bits.”75 The encryption space with 128 bit AES is well above 3.4 x 1038 
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combinations.76 Other advances in encryption have been made, such as Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman (RSA) asymmetric encryption, but AES is the standard used by the government 
and many U.S. manufacturers of electronic data storage devices today.77 AES is alleged 
to be practically impenetrable to all known hacking methods and attempts to crack the 
encryption with available computing power would take years. However, researchers 
believe that it is only a matter of time before AES can be compromised. According to a 
recent article in Wired magazine, “quantum computers, which are fundamentally different 
from traditional computers because they leverage quantum mechanics to do calculations, 
could easily decrypt the advanced encryption we use widely.”78 In the meantime, experts 
have claimed to defeat the security of devices with AES and RSA encrypted data by 
attacking the device itself and exploiting engineering flaws in them.79  
The first section of this chapter had multiple intentions. While providing a 
background on the evolution of encryption, it also showed that in over 2,000 years, only 
one method, the one-time pad, has been used to encrypt data that could not be cracked 
given sufficient time. It also showed that even in this one instance in which this 
encryption method was proven mathematically to be perfectly secret, it could still be 
exploited in the right circumstances. As this thesis develops, this critical point will be 
revisited; encrypted data will likely always be vulnerable. This understanding is an 
essential element of informed debate over the idea that an industry orchestrated option to 
access encrypted devices and communications should be a requirement. It is the crux of 
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the argument that technologists embrace as they battle those in favor of exceptional 
access, and one that has not changed in over 20 years.  
C. THE CRYPTO WARS TO PRESENT DAY 
As mentioned in the literature review, the debate over encryption that populated 
headlines over the past two years is not novel. In the time DES was publicly 
compromised and an AES solution was developed, a significant event relative to 
encryption unfolded. During the 1990s, those in favor of the government’s exceptional 
access to encrypted data squared off philosophically against those in favor of technology 
in a time referred to as the Crypto Wars. The Crypto Wars is an important event worth 
touching upon as it reveals the embedded positions and rhetoric of two groups that set the 
foundation for what has become an interminable debate. The flashpoint of the event was 
over two significant issues, a technology referred to as the Clipper Chip and export 
controls on encryption technology.80 Following the Crypto Wars in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the debate was relatively quiet about encryption and the government’s need 
for exceptional access. In 2013, the illegal release of information by Edward Snowden 
triggered events within the United States that brought the encryption debate back to a 
daily conversation topic.  
1. The Clipper Chip 
The Clipper Chip proposal was an initiative launched under the Clinton 
administration to address concerns by intelligence and law enforcement agencies over 
access to encrypted information. The actual chip was a piece of hardware known as 
MYK-78 that was to be installed in communication devices to enable encryption, while 
also allowing for government access under set judicial rules. The proposal was outlined 
by the NIST and approved by the Department of Commerce in the federal information 
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processing standards (FIPS) publication entitled, Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES).81 
According to the White House:  
This new technology will help companies protect proprietary information, 
protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent 
unauthorized release of data transmitted electronically. At the same time 
this technology preserves the ability of federal, state and local law 
enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of 
criminals.82  
This goal was accomplished through the use of “spare keys.”83 These “spare 
keys” were more formally known as a “key escrow system,” in which the government 
maintained each chip’s two-part encryption key.84 When law enforcement obtained 
lawful authorization, each part of the two-part key would be released by the NIST and 
Treasury Department.85 The algorithm to be used in the encryption, Skipjack, was 
developed by the National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA set forth two requirements 
for the use of its technology, which was deemed to be significantly stronger than DES; 
that the government be involved with device manufacturing in the installation of the chip 
to ensure authorized use and that it include a backdoor for law enforcement known as the 
law enforcement access field (LEAF).86  
The Clipper Chip initiative was immediately met with opposition. In fact, “Nearly 
all of the comments received from industry and individuals opposed the adoption of the 
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standard, raising concerns about a variety of issues.”87 Two predominant arguments 
voiced at the time are important to the analysis of solutions going forward, privacy, 
compounded by access and vulnerability, and economics.88  
Privacy advocates argued that the government’s third-party control of the 
technology and keys opened up the possibility for unauthorized access. This possibility 
for unauthorized access was articulated in two forms, by the government should its 
interests so dictate or by an illicit actor through the natural vulnerability of the technology 
created with a backdoor.  
Economically speaking, arguments were made about an unreasonable cost for the 
technology and its upkeep, competitiveness of U.S. businesses in foreign markets, and an 
unfair competitive advantage to the one U.S. business chosen to manufacture the chips.89 
These points of contention were part of comments made by 22 government organizations, 
22 industry organizations, and over 275 individuals during the FIPS review process.90 
Amidst public outcry in opposition to the Clipper Chip, the initial debate on the 
issue came to a hard stop in 1994; after additional attempts in the 1990s to implement 
similar proposals, in 2015, it was officially withdrawn.91 The initial stop was due to a 
discovery by Matthew Blaze, a computer scientist at AT&T Bell Laboratories, who 
discovered, “Rogue applications defeat EES by making use of the cipher without the 
government back door.”92 Although similar efforts were made to implement a Clipper 
Chip solution to access in the mid to latter part of the 1990s, many overwhelming 
opposition views and technological obstacles prevented the ideas from ever being viable. 
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An additional limiting factor was drastic changes to encryption controls in the United 
States.  
2. Export Controls of Encryption Items 
The other front being simultaneously fought by the administration during this 
time period of the Crypto Wars focused on export controls. Prior to 1996, Cold War era 
laws limited the dissemination of sensitive weapons and technologies, including 
encryption, in an effort to give the United States the upper hand in maintaining its 
security interests in foreign intelligence.93 Two acts were used explicitly in this 
regulatory activity. According to the National Research Council, “Authority to regulate 
imports and exports of products with cryptographic capabilities to and from the United 
States derive from…The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1949 (intended to regulate 
munitions) and the Export Administration Act (EAA; intended to regulate so-called dual 
use products).”94 By treating all encryption products as munitions defined under the 
United States Munitions List as, “articles, services, and related technical 
data…designated as defense articles or defense services pursuant to section 38 and 47(7) 
of the AECA,” dissemination of encryption was effectively regulated by the 
government.95 
However, as internet technology advanced in the 1980s and 1990s, the laws were 
found effectively to stifle the economic growth of U.S. companies, while failing to deter 
equal and greater advances of encryption effectively in other countries.96 According to 
the Harvard Business Review, “The lost business resulting from the export control system 
costs U.S. companies $9.3 billion a year. But the real price of export controls is almost 
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certainly much higher. Because of the export control system, the United States is losing 
vast trade opportunities—in Eastern Europe and the developing world.”97  
This loss brought pressure from the private sector and the U.S. Congress to 
influence change by the administration. The Clinton administration recognized the issue, 
and in 1996, released their regulatory proposal entitled, Achieving Privacy, Commerce, 
Security and Public Safety in the Global Information Infrastructure. In a statement from 
the White House, Vice President Al Gore stated, “For export controls purposes, 
commercial encryption products will no longer be treated as munitions. After 
consultation with Congress, jurisdiction for commercial encryption controls will be 
transferred from the State Department to the Commercial Department.”98 The 
administration remained focused in this plan on key escrow and key recovery. 
Congressional leaders exerted further deregulatory pressure by drafting legislation 
like Representative Robert Goodlatte’s Security and Freedom through Encryption 
(SAFE) Act. Responding to the White House plan, Senator Conrad Burns stated, “[T]he 
third version of the Administration’s Clipper Chip proposal is a swing and a miss. It’s 
time to quit relying on government mandates for what is truly a matter of great concern to 
the private sector: the expansion of commerce on the Internet and other computer 
networks.”99  
In the face of mounting pressure, in 1999 the administration made further 
concessions to export control, which resulted in a regulatory rule change by the 
Department of Commerce. Ultimately, the export administration regulations were 
amended to remove language about key escrow, allow for the export of encryption items 
to all destinations with the exception of countries supporting terrorism, and fall in line 
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with many of the stipulations set forth in the Wassenaar Arrangement.100 In fact, the 
Wassenaar Arrangement set forth many of the guidelines, elements, and procedures that 
became the basis for many of the encryption export policies of the United States and the 
42 other countries that joined following its establishment in 1995.101  
With this 1999 announcement and 2000 rule change, the Crypto Wars effectively 
ended. Those in opposition to government access, privacy advocates, and private 
enterprise representatives hailed it as a victory. More importantly, it established a strong, 
tested foundation upon which to wage a battle against exceptional access. Efforts to 
revisit the issue would not return in full force until Edward Snowden’s unlawful release 
of national security information.  
3. Snowden 
In 2013, NSA contractor Edward Snowden illegally shared a voluminous amount 
of data and information pertaining to NSA programs. Amongst the documents shared 
with members of the press was evidence of extensive cooperation and information 
sharing between the government and communications providers. AT&T, for example, 
was shown to have shared billions of emails and phone records from 2003 to 2013.102 At 
the same time, documents revealed the NSA was collecting an extraordinary number of 
phone records of Verizon customers daily.103 
Legal collection of information from communications companies has been 
authorized historically through statutes like the CALEA, the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA), and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Snowden’s 
disclosures revealed that much of the information being gathered on U.S. citizens, and 
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others, may have been due to an extremely liberal interpretation of some of these acts, 
and potentially with disregard for these laws in some cases. As a result, two things 
occurred. The public, surprised by the actions of the government, called for stronger 
encryption of their communications, and private companies answered these calls. The 
former Director of National Intelligence stated in 2016, “As a result of the Snowden 
revelations, the onset of commercial encryption has accelerated by seven years.”104  
Conscious of the existing laws, companies like Apple and Google implemented 
encryption protocols that were not only comprehensive but also ensured they would 
satisfy the restrictions within acts like CALEA. For example, CALEA states that a 
“telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the 
government’s ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or 
customer, unless the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the 
information necessary to decrypt the communication.”105 Apple meets this requirement 
with its encryption, which, in part, re-stoked the encryption debate from the 1990s. Apple 
states in its privacy policy, “And we can’t unlock your device for anyone because you 
hold the key—your unique password.”106  
Not being able to unlock a device was the crux of the argument between the 
government and Apple following the San Bernardino terrorist attacks. The government’s 
inability to access the phone of one of the terrorists prompted a renewed outcry from 
many government officials about the need for a solution to exceptional access. The 
government attempted to challenge Apple’s resistance to assist by issuing an order to the 
company under the All Writs Act of 1789. The government allegedly wanted Apple to 
push an authorized update to the terrorist’s phone using the company’s digital certificate 
of authentication. The update would have enabled the government to attempt a brute 
force attack of the device to allow an unlimited number of password attempts without 
interruption. Apple, and others opposed to exceptional access, immediately rejected the 
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request and challenged it in court. Privacy advocates and technologists echoed the same 
arguments of the 1990s. They raised concerns that exceptional access solutions would 
weaken encryption, leave U.S. companies at a disadvantage in the global market, and 
potentially compromise lawful peoples’ rights to privacy from the government on their 
electronic devices.  
Privacy advocates and technologists are on the prevailing side of the debate, as 
encryption has proliferated unfettered. The rapid advances in encryption and actions of 
technology companies caught intelligence and law enforcement agencies off-guard. Law 
enforcement was already struggling to stay afloat as it faced a growing number of 
investigations involving digital evidence.107 The added complications of modern-day 
encryption have further stymied some of their efforts to fight crime and terrorism.  
D. THE CHALLENGE FOR U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 
While those in opposition to exceptional access have been quietly enjoying what 
has become the status quo for protecting data, those on the other side of the debate, 
namely law enforcement, have experienced growing challenges in fulfilling their duties to 
those they serve and protect. As criminal investigators, law enforcement is tasked with 
collecting evidence that can be used by the government to prove guilt or establish 
innocence for a number of incidents that range from car accidents to human trafficking. 
For any investigation, dozens of pieces of evidence can be integral to achieving their 
goals, but mobile devices are quickly becoming a universally present evidence source for 
a responding law enforcement officer.  
As society moves towards a greater use of mobile devices, the reliance on them 
for evidentiary value has become the norm. As a result, digital laboratories in police 
departments and federal law enforcement agencies are rapidly filling up with digital 
evidence as devices are seized by law enforcement in the course of investigations. The 
Law Enforcement Cyber Center, a collaborative project of the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police (IACP), RAND Corporation, and the Police Executive Research 
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Forum (PERF), funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, at the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Justice Programs reports that departments around the country 
face large digital evidence backlogs.108 According to Hitchcock et al., “The issue of the 
increasing backlog of digital evidence waiting to be examined in many police 
departments is well documented.”109 A recent media outlet’s investigation into backlogs 
of electronic evidence reported, “The explosion of smartphones and apps, and the 
growing size of computer hard drives has created a glut of evidence for investigators in 
recent years.”110 In Maryland, for example, the state police investigations lab that 
processes electronic evidence has a 10-month backlog.111 Encryption, in addition to the 
sheer volume of devices, is a contributing factor to the increased wait times.  
The issue is not exclusive to the United States. Although this thesis explores 
options for domestic solutions to encrypted devices, it is important to recognize that 
countries overseas are encountering an issue that knows no borders. According to Luc 
Beirens, superintendent of the Federal Computer Crime Unit (FCCU) in Belgium, “The 
number of seized computers is a multitude of the number that was seized ten years ago. 
Every person that we search probably owns a desktop computer, a laptop, an iPad, and a 
smart phone, and in addition you may see a pile of external hard disks. All those systems 
need to be investigated.”112 Many of those devices are utilizing encryption, which only 
adds to the backlog. 
The volume of electronic evidence is a growing problem for law enforcement, but 
of equal or greater concern, is the number of devices that exist in evidence that cannot be 
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accessed due to encryption. As a result of encryption, comprehensible data residing on a 
device cannot be accessed unless it is decrypted. According to the FBI,  
the government’s inability to access information residing on devices is 
known as going dark. Law enforcement faces two distinct Going Dark 
challenges. The first concerns real-time court-ordered interception of data 
in motion, such as phone calls, e-mail, text messages, and chat sessions. 
The second challenge concerns “data at rest”—court-ordered access to 
data stored on devices, like e-mail, text messages, photos, and videos. 
Both real-time communications and stored data are increasingly difficult 
for law enforcement to obtain with a court order or warrant. This is 
eroding law enforcement’s ability to quickly obtain valuable information 
that may be used to identity and save victims, reveal evidence to convict 
perpetrators, or exonerate the innocent.113 
Forensic Focus, founded in 2002, claims to be the internet’s leading digital 
forensics portal for computer forensics.114 In a September 2015 survey of 500 digital 
forensic examiners conducted by the group, they asked, “In your opinion, what is the 
biggest challenge facing digital forensic investigators today?”115 Approximately 21% of 
respondents answered that encryption was among the top two concerns of the 12 options; 
cloud forensics was the largest concern.116 
Several law enforcement leaders have been vocal on the issue, most rallying 
behind former FBI Director James Comey. Director Comey made a spirited charge at the 
issue in hearings and panels he attended during his tenure.117 This drive was despite the 
fact that encryption did not initially appear to be the same challenge for federal agencies 
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as it is for state and local law enforcement officials. In 2016, FBI general counsel Jim 
Baker said that the FBI is able to get the data it needs 87% of the time.118 However, in 
the first six months of fiscal year 2017, the FBI’s ability to access the data it needed on 
electronic devices dropped to 54% of the time.119 This drop-off indicates how quickly the 
encryption problem is growing.  
Data presented from local law enforcement supports this belief. The Manhattan 
District Attorney, Cyrus Vance Jr., stated in testimony on Capitol Hill that “local law 
enforcement agencies do not have the resources to access each lawfully-seized 
device.”120 Vance has been extremely transparent about the issue and has well-articulated 
the argument in his own interviews and testimony since thrusting New York City’s 
challenges with encrypted devices into the spotlight in 2016. According to Vance, 
between 2015 and 2016, the number of Apple devices part of investigations in his office 
that cannot be cracked, including rape and murder cases, quadrupled to 423.121 (See 
Figure 1) In testimony on Capitol Hill to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), 
he reiterated this sentiment stating: 
Let me give you the impact of this new encryption protocol introduced by 
Apple. In my Office alone, we now have more than 310 lawfully-seized 
iPhones running iOS 8 or 9 that are completely inaccessible, despite court-
ordered search warrants having been issued for them. These devices 
represent hundreds of real crimes against New Yorkers that we cannot 
fully investigate, including cases of homicide, child sex abuse, human 
trafficking, assault, cybercrime, and identity theft.122 
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By all appearances, the ability of the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office to utilize 
device data effectively potentially to prosecute cases with significant community impact 
is foiled in many instances due to encryption, as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1.   Encrypted iOS Devices Related to Open Investigations at the 
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office in 2016123 
Model  Number of Devices 
iPads  30 
iPhone 4S    1 
iPhone 5    9 
iPhone 5C    5 
iPhone 5S   51 
iPhone 6 166 
iPhone 6 SE    2 
iPhone 6+   66 
iPhone 6S   63 
iPhone 6S+   30 
Total Devices 423 
 
In an interview with Fortune magazine, Vance speculated that based on the 
numbers of encrypted, inaccessible cell phones in New York County, and approximately 
20,000 counties in the United States, thousands of mobile phones could be in the hands of 
investigators and prosecutors that are of little use due to encryption.124 In his testimony to 
the SASC, he corroborated this claim with information from other police departments 
across the country. District Attorney Vance stated:  
The data from across the country tells a similar story. In California, the 
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department has amassed more than 150 
inaccessible devices, the Los Angeles Police Department has more than 
300, and the Roseville Police Department has more than 200. Riverside 
County, California has 12 inaccessible devices connected to murder cases 
alone. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department in North Carolina 
has 160 inaccessible devices. In Texas, the Harris County District 
Attorney’s Office collected more than 100 inaccessible devices in 2015 
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and have encountered 8 to 10 inaccessible devices per month so far this 
year. And in Massachusetts, the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office 
has 129 inaccessible devices.125 
The encrypted devices presented in this testimony, from a small fraction of the local law 
enforcement agencies in the country, are the overwhelming challenge law enforcement 
faces.  
District Attorney Vance’s presence on the Hill, along with former Director 
Comey’s, had the intention of spurring action on the part of federal legislators. Their 
efforts appear to have fallen short, as no momentum could be gained to move legislation 
forward. Senators Diane Feinstein and Richard Burr of the U.S. Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence floated the idea of legislation with a discussion draft entitled, Compliance 
with Court Orders Act of 2016.126 It was met with the same level of resistance as 
proposals during the Crypto Wars, lacked support from the Obama Administration, as 
well as the House of Representatives, and was ultimately never filed.127 Senator Mark 
Warner and House of Representatives Chairman Michael McCaul did file bicameral 
legislation in the 114th Congress. Their Digital Security Commission Act of 2016 would 
have established a commission of, “the most capable experts and stakeholders from law 
enforcement, the technology industry, the intelligence community, and privacy and civil 
liberties communities to discuss the challenges and advise policy makers on this complex 
issue [of encryption].”128 The ultimate goal would have been to provide 
recommendations on the subject, upon which lawmakers could act. However, following 
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its introduction to the House, this bill never left the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 
Homeland Security, and Investigations.129  
Despite the calls from law enforcement in 2016, no other legislation was filed to 
assist the government with access to encrypted devices; likewise, nothing of substance 
appears to be on the horizon during the 115th Congress. Thus far, Congress has proven 
unable to legislate a solution to the device encryption issue; if it has shown anything over 
the past 20 years on the issue, it is reticence. This stance does not change the data 
conveyed by District Attorney Vance about the growing numbers of inaccessible 
encrypted devices that are stacking up in law enforcement evidence rooms.  
As this chapter has discussed, the Crypto Wars of the 1990s ended with the 
government surrendering efforts to gain exceptional access to the interests of personal 
privacy and global commercial competitiveness. Since then, governmental needs to 
access encrypted evidence, especially on devices, has grown exponentially. In the United 
States, solutions to bridging this growing divide have proven elusive. Given the lack of 
legislative progress and enduring arguments from the Crypto Wars of the 1990s, an 
examination of encryption policy in other countries, in an effort to address the issue in the 
United States, is in order.  
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III. ENCRYPTION POLICY IN ISRAEL 
The Israeli encryption control mechanisms operate without directly 
legislating any form of encryption-key depositories, built-in back or front 
door access points, or other similar requirements. Instead, Israel’s system 
emphasizes smooth initial licensing processes and cultivates government-
private sector collaboration.130 
—Attorneys Matthew Waxman and Doron Hindin  
 
These people [from the Israel Police’s cybercrime unit] can take almost 
any hardware product and extract information from it. Even if it had been 
dropped into water, burnt, probed or smashed. If there is a physical way to 
extract information from it, the cybercrime unit laboratory will be able to 
do it.131 
—Writer Ami Rojkes Dombe  
 
Israel is considered a world leader in cyber and has an established approach to 
dealing with device encryption.132 Israel’s sociocultural security environment is the 
foundation of its approach. The country’s location in the Middle East and its policies on 
military service has forged a mindset of security and a strong network amongst its 
inhabitants. The structural feature in its approach is the law enforcement unit tasked with 
device encryption. The cybercrime unit consists of a centralized forensic unit and a 
network of officers strategically located across the country under unified control who 
specialize in data extraction from electronic devices. The unit’s work is enhanced by the 
relationships the government has with the military, private sector, and academia. Finally, 
a regulatory framework and applicable laws exists that provide context to its approach. 
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The result is a country that appears to have a reasonable approach to the extraction of 
data from encrypted devices without leaving the country mired in a debate over 
exceptional access.  
A. THE SOCIOCULTURAL ENVIRONMENT OF ISRAEL  
The State of Israel, declared on May 14, 1948, is a country of approximately 8.1 
million people, 75% of whom are ethnically Jewish.133 Israel’s government is a 
parliamentary democracy that came, “into existence with surprisingly robust and tested 
democratic institutions and traditions.”134 In part, due to its location, Israel has endured a 
tenuous security status for almost all of its existence. The country has engaged in wars 
with Arab forces on no less than five occasions in 1948–1949, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 
1982.135  
In regards to a sociocultural mindset of security, these military engagements 
served to focus the country and its population on the importance of security and resilience 
under values of nationalism. Military service for both sexes is compulsory at the age of 
18 for the majority of the population, Jews, and Druze, with 32 months required for 
enlisted men and 24 months for enlisted women.136 This requirement was intended to be 
more than a call to arms.137 Bringing the nation closer together, while instilling a military 
focus based on a shared experience, ensures that the majority of citizens, including those 
in government, recognize the need for policies and relationships to preserve security. 
Further, with the government recruiting for certain positions beginning in high school, it 
cultivates security knowledge at a young age and lasting relationships beyond military 
service.138 The result is Israel’s security network, an integrated relationship between 
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security and civilian actors that shapes the country’s policymaking processes and policies 
in multiple spheres.139 Cyber is the relevant sphere in the Israeli network for the purposes 
of this chapter.  
Relative to fostering development in the area of technology, it should be 
acknowledged that Israel is a world leader in cybersecurity. In 2010, Israel launched the 
National Cyber Initiative, with the goal of being one of the top five cyber powers in the 
world by 2015.140 Prime Minister Netanyahu refocused this goal on cybersecurity, and in 
2017, he declared it had been achieved, with Israel receiving 1/5 of the world’s global 
private investment in cybersecurity.141 Researchers found, “companies in Israel, a 
country comprising less than 0.11% of the world’s population, are estimated to have sold 
10% ($6 billion out of $60 billion) of global encryption and cyber technologies for 
2014.”142 Israel’s focus on cyber stems from work within the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD), and a coordinated effort on the part of its government, to compensate for a lack 
of other resources and to pre-empt further costly wars with its neighbors. A 2012 study 
conducted by McAfee and the Brussels think-tank, Security and Defence Agenda, found 
Israel to rank at the top of 23 countries in cyberdefense.143  
This growth in Israel’s private cybersecurity industry reflects the integrated 
relationship between its security and civilian sectors. As Israeli defense journalist Alon 
Bed-David observes, “The whole of the Israeli cyber industry relies on knowledge 
gathered by people serving in Israel’s different security agencies and military.”144 Cyber 
intelligence units presently make up the largest populated units of the Israeli Defense 
Force (IDF).145 Approximately 20,000 cyber-soldiers are in the IDF and the country is 
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constructing the Beersheeba cybersecurity complex to centralize their efforts. The 
complex that will house these cyber-soldiers, located in Israel’s fourth largest city, is a 
$5B compound dedicated to defensive and offensive cyber operations, and will arguably 
be the largest infrastructure project in Israel’s history.146  
The result of this emphasis on cybersecurity in the military is that the IDF has 
become the largest human resources organization for the country’s cybersecurity 
industry. The skills and methods learned by these young soldiers, who are typically free 
of conscription by the age of 23, are priceless in the open market. The training and 
missions undertaken in the IDF’s C4I Directorate, and specifically the IDF’s elite cyber 
group, Unit 8200, are unsurpassed by almost any country other than the United States.147 
One assignment for personnel of Unit 8200 was documented as follows:  
Break into the computers of a country that remained in a state of hostility 
with Israel. The task contained several hurdles: First, figure out how to get 
into those computers; second, how to crack the encryption; and finally, the 
monumental challenge, how to access the “enormous amount” of 
computing power necessary to decrypt the data.148 
One of the IDF members tasked with this assignment went on to start the successful web 
development company Wix.149 Israel has former soldiers founding and staffing similar 
technology companies like Waze and Indegy, and most importantly for this thesis, the 
NSO Group, White-Hat Ltd., and Cellebrite.  
For example, White-Hat Ltd., an Israeli company founded by a former IDF 
soldier, delivers cyber-intelligence services around the world and is staffed with a large 
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number of former IDF cyber-soldiers.150 During the WannaCry cyber-attack in 2017, 
White-Hat Ltd. sent its customers, many of whom are Israeli based, a “vaccine,” within 
an hour of the attack.151 Meanwhile, Israel’s top cybersecurity official, Baruch Carmeli, 
reported no evidence indicating the country fell victim to this attack.152  
Similarly, Cellebrite Mobile Synchronization, Ltd., founded in Israel in 1999, 
“develops solutions for the mobile retail and forensic industries...[and] offers a universal 
forensic extraction device (UFED)…[for] law enforcement, military, intelligence, 
security, and government agencies in Israel and internationally.”153 Cellebrite employs 
IDF Unit 8200 veterans including Gilad Sahar and Tom Gol, who later left to establish a 
counter-UAV company.154 A highlight video of the Israel Police cybercrime unit 
situation room in Israel features a technician using a Cellebrite UFED instrument, which 
is used to extract data from devices.155 Cellebrite also operates a subsidiary, Cellebrite 
USA Corp., that contracts services for U.S. law enforcement agencies including the FBI, 
Secret Service, Customs and Border Patrol, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
Drug Enforcement Administration, and Securities and Exchange Commission.156 
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Contracts with these agencies are part of the approximately 60,000 contracts the company 
has in over 150 countries.157  
As these examples show, the cybersecurity talent and skills cultivated in Israel’s 
sociocultural security environment are evident. The country’s cyberdefenses rank at the 
top among developed countries. Personnel contributing to this achievement in the 
military have gone on to establish or be part of Israeli companies that excel in the field. 
This expertise is the basis for Israel’s efforts relative to data extraction from encrypted 
devices undertaken by its police force. The Israel Police exhibit its own abilities, 
supported by this expertise, through its cybercrime unit. 
B. STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS TO ENCRYPTED DATA EXTRACTION 
The Israeli government has a centralized national police force, the Israel Police, 
under the control of the state government, with districts throughout the country.158 The 
country benefits by organizing a singular effort to defeat device encryption for law 
enforcement purposes. A notable feature of the police force is that all Israel Police 
officers have already served in the IDF. According to the Israel Police website, all 
potential police officer candidates must possess an IDF certificate of discharge, further 
affirmation of the Israeli security network that exists within the country.159 Within this 
police force of former IDF soldiers is a unit dedicated to cybercrime, including the 
extraction of data from encrypted devices.  
1. Israel Police Cybercrime Unit 
Within the Israel Police force, a centralized cybercrime unit operating under 
LAHAV 433 has been in existence for approximately three years, although it dates back 
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to the 1990s as a less formal organization.160 This cybercrime unit possesses a forensic 
capability, and under the unit, is a network of cyber officers throughout Israel serving 
individual communities that have the ability to elevate complex tasks to their 
headquarters. Much of the unit’s time is spent on the forensic extraction of data from 
computers and devices, especially in the individual districts of the police force. 
According to a 2017 report from the Israel State Comptroller:  
The District Command directs the cyber officers to assist other 
investigative teams in the district in handling evidence captured by digital 
devices such as a computer, tablet, smartphone, and camera…The State 
Comptroller’s Office found that the vast majority of cyber officers’ work 
in the provinces focuses on producing digital evidence.161  
In some cases, this outcome is to the detriment of other cybercrime investigations. The 
report details an excess of attention directed towards digital evidence extraction, at the 
cost of focusing efforts on complex cybercrime cases.162 Despite the criticism the unit 
received relative to complex cases, it appears to be accomplished in its ability to extract 
data from devices. According to one Israeli government publication:  
The third pillar of the cybercrime unit is the forensics laboratory. These 
people can take almost any hardware product and extract information from 
it. Even if it had been dropped into water, burnt, probed or smashed. If 
there is a physical way to extract information from it, the cybercrime unit 
laboratory will be able to do it. Hard disk drives, cellular phones, portable 
storage devices and many other types of media.163 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Israel Police use technology developed by 
Cellebrite for data extraction, which is similar to some U.S. law enforcement 
organizations that also depend on Cellebrite.  
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The Israeli modus operandi for cybercrime is distinct from that of the United 
States, which relies on a decentralized system of multiple federal agencies, along with 
state and local agencies often acting independently to combat challenges like device 
encryption. On an operational level, some U.S. law enforcement agencies have forensic 
laboratories or access to state laboratories but throughout the country lack the robust, 
unified approach Israel uses. Attempts to address this deficiency with programs like the 
FBI’s regional computer forensic laboratories (RCFLs) or the Secret Service’s electronic 
crimes task forces (ECTFs) have not yet succeeded in meeting the needs of the United 
States in this area. 
2. Partnerships 
The Israeli cybercrime unit’s work is enhanced by the relationships the 
government has to the military, private sector, and academia. These partnerships 
contribute to the structure and approach of the unit to encryption.  
First is recruitment for the Israel Police from the military. All police officers are 
former members of the IDF.164 No documentation is available stating that recruits joining 
the Israel Police were trained in cyber in the military, or that those who were are being 
directly funneled to the cybercrime unit. However, the Israel Police rely on military 
veterans in the laboratory of its cybercrime unit. In this way, some level of military 
training is leveraged for the purposes of device encryption.  
Second, relative to private sector relationships, companies like Cellebrite that also 
recruit from the military, are a source for equipment to Israeli law enforcement for device 
encryption extraction.165 Further, Israel has pushed to improve the relationships between 
the private sector and law enforcement through events like, “hackathons.” In 2015, Ben-
Gurion University of the Negev, in coordination with LAHAV 433, held a “Future Cop” 
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hackathon amongst police, private security operators, civilians, and students to solve hi-
tech problems facing law enforcement.166  
The hackathon referenced previously also represents collaboration with academia. 
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (BGU) was one of the first two schools of higher 
education to partner with the government; the other was the University of Tel Aviv.167 
BGU is also located at the site where the military is constructing its new $5B facility. 
Part of the facility already constructed is the BGU cyber security research center. The 
center is a partnership between the government and the university, which houses a 
number of labs, one of which is dedicated to device issues like encryption in the mobile 
security lab.168  
The Israel Police’s method of extracting encrypted data from devices described 
previously happens through its cybercrime unit. This method is not altogether different 
from law enforcement’s approach in the United States, except that in Israel, it is under 
one umbrella and is not lobbying to change its approach. The relationships established in 
Israel with the military, private sector, and academia enhances the country’s ability to 
exploit encrypted data on devices. Techniques used by the police force or private 
companies to obtain this information would be considered a form of ethical or lawful 
hacking.169 The term is a diplomatic phrase to describe law enforcement’s legal 
exploitation of encrypted data on a device. This course of action is one that has, thus far, 
been advocated for by the Israeli security network and acted upon by the Israel Police.  
The extraction of encrypted data in Israel appears to occur without the prevalence 
of debate experienced in the United States. The use of lawful hacking as an alternative to 
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legislating exceptional access may partly be the reason why Israel has escaped such a 
paralyzing debate. 
C. ENCRYPTION REGULATORY POLICY AND APPLICABLE LAWS IN 
ISRAEL  
The final aspects of Israel’s encryption approach are the regulatory frameworks 
within which the Israel Police must act. To cover device encryption policy in Israel and 
its potential applicability to the United States properly, this section examines Israel’s 
regulatory policy and applicable laws.  
1. Regulation of Encryption 
Some have speculated that the Israeli encryption laws, along with the cultural 
norms of the country, allow for superior technological development.170 One scholar on 
Israel states, “This approach is, in fact, quite characteristic of Israel, in that flexibility and 
ad hoc solutions are generally preferred to more rigid and formalistic approaches.”171 
This approach fosters the capabilities of Israeli technology companies to develop while 
enhancing the relationships of the government.  
Many countries control the production, sale, and export of encryption technology 
through dual use regulations. Dual use goods and technologies refer to those things that 
are typically used for civilian purposes but may have military applications. The 
Wassenaar Arrangement influences the United States’ position on dual use regulations 
including encryption export policies. Encryption-capable products are covered under this 
arrangement; Israel is not a member. Instead, Israel relies on a number of laws and 
regulations passed within the country over the past 60 years. Israel controls encryption 
and other products primarily through its Law Governing the Control of Commodities and 
Services Law—1957 (5717), Order Regarding the Engagement with Encryption Items—
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1974 (5734), and a 1998 amendment to the 1957 law, the Commercial Encryption Items 
Export Controls Policy, that was updated in 1999.172  
In 2014, Israel sold 10% of global encryption.173 The Government of Israel 
explains that the regulatory actions it takes are partly responsible. The Israel Ministry of 
Defense states on its website:  
In applying the system of control and licensing of encryption items, every 
effort is made to maintain a proper balance between the needs of the 
individual and the industry whilst keeping the essential requirement of the 
State to maintain adequate control over the dissemination of means of 
encryption in Israel and abroad. The purpose of regulating engagement in 
items of encryption is to enable the Israeli encryption industry—one of the 
most advanced in the world—to develop, produce, sell and export its 
products while at the same time safeguarding the national security 
interests of the State of Israel.174 
Israel’s stated intention is achieved through longstanding regulatory practices pertaining 
to encryption that are unique to the country. 
Generally speaking, policy breaks down into the following areas: use, 
development and production, import for sales and distribution purposes, sales within 
Israel, and export.175 Each area is subject to licensing requirements, typically under a 
license for engagement in encryption items, under which Israel regulates the technology. 
In almost all cases, to engage with encryption, the government must be made aware, 
assess the technical aspects of the product, and issue a license.176 The few exemptions 
that exist typically apply to electronic signatures and open-source encryption 
downloadable from the internet.177 Ultimately, one of four different types of licenses is 
issued following approval: restricted licenses, special license, general license, or free 
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means license.178 The restricted license and special license have the most stringent 
requirements, including annual renewal, and are characteristically issued to those 
engaging with restricted countries or sectors.179  
Two important points can be made about the majority of licensing that benefits 
the country. The first is the simplicity and speed of the process. The government’s 
website lays out instructions for emailing or mailing the application and technological 
specifications of the encryption to the Encryption Control Unit of the Defense Export 
Control Agency.180 According to the MOD, the average time for the licensing process in 
2014 was just under eight days.181 The second point concerns the benefits that 
accompanied the addition of the Free Means License in 1998, under the amendment 
previously referenced. It literally means that encryption items can be declared 
“decontrolled,” or free, following receipt and approval of the application, which then 
renders them exempt from further controls.182 A list is published on the Government of 
Israel’s website. Over 11,500 licenses have been issued since 1999.183 Most commercial 
vendors, including Apple for their IOS and Google for their Android operating systems, 
fall into this category.184  
It is important to note that:  
The Israeli encryption control mechanisms operate without directly 
legislating any form of encryption-key depositories, built-in back or front 
door access points, or other similar requirements. Instead, Israel’s system 
emphasizes smooth initial licensing processes and cultivates government-
private sector collaboration.185 
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Scholars argue that the characteristics of this user-friendly regulatory process encourage 
participation, innovation, and freedom in the field of encryption. This efficient, simple 
regulatory process establishes a foundation for partnerships between the government and 
the private sector discussed in the previous section. In addition, the processes allow the 
government to have insight into novel encryption technologies before they hit the market 
and better position themselves to manage issues effectively with them down the road with 
this advance knowledge.186 Some of these claims are speculative and evidence is lacking 
to prove causality. However, policies of the country have clearly launched it into a 
category of top producers of encryption while allowing it to also be a world leader in 
cybersecurity.  
2. Civil Liberties and Stored Information in Israel 
The laws protecting information stored on devices in Israel are comparable to 
those in the United States under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The 
basis for them can be found in the protection of civil liberties, where one independent 
watchdog ranks the two countries similarly in the countries’ observance of the rule of 
law.187 Looking at civil liberties as a whole, the United States ranks higher than Israel, 
and although security is a cited factor, it is not clear that a subcategory of cybersecurity is 
the reason for the disparity.  
In Israel, since the First Knesset was unable to put a constitution together, it 
legislated basic laws on various subjects.188 In March 17, 1992, it passed the Tenth Basic 
Law of Israel, Human Dignity and Liberty. The purpose of the law is to “protect human 
dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as 
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a Jewish and democratic state.”189 This basic law has several subsections, and all 
encompass the spirit of the title.  
The portions of the basic law relevant to searching a device can be found in 
sections three and seven, which set forth the protection of property and rights to privacy, 
respectively. Section three states, “There shall be no violation of the property of a 
person.”190 The relevant subsections of section seven read, “(a) All persons have the right 
to privacy and to intimacy...(c) No search shall be conducted on the private premises of a 
person, nor in the body or personal effects…(d) There shall be no violation of the 
confidentiality of conversation, or the writings or records of a person.”191 It is important 
to note that the final section of this law does lay out circumstances in which a state of 
emergency is declared, which can allow the government to, “deny or restrict rights,” 
under this law for a reasonable amount of time.192 Absent the state of emergency, the 
government is required to follow legal procedures and obtain a warrant from a court to 
search a device.193 The legal standard to obtain a warrant in Israel, like the United States, 
is based on reasonableness. An Israeli court may issue a search warrant if the judge, “has 
reason to believe that it was used or is intended to be used for an illegal purpose.”194  
D. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS  
In research for this thesis, the only reference to the encryption debate emanating 
from Israel was a comment regarding end-to-end encryption service by Israeli 
Intelligence Minister Yisrael Katz. Katz stated in a conference, “We will not block these 
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services [like WhatsApp].”195 Further, no documented debates have taken place in the 
Knesset or comments made from Prime Minister Netanyahu expressing concern or 
consternation over the issue. Meanwhile, officials from countries like the United States, 
Canada, Brazil, Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and Australia all offer 
opinions and concerned debate on exceptional access. All other references relative to 
Israel concerning exceptional access pertained to Israel’s Cellebrite, as the reported 
means by which the FBI was able to access the phone of the San Bernardino terrorist.196  
The question of whether Israel’s ability to access encrypted devices is better than 
the United States is a matter of debate; with a lack of publicly available information on 
the subject, this thesis is unable to make such a determination. Instead, it affirms several 
other points germane to the debate that indicate this aspect of Israel’s approach is worthy 
of consideration.  
The country of Israel relies on its centralized law enforcement and cybercrime 
unit with assistance from private partners like Cellebrite, along with ties to the military 
and academia. Research reveals that Israel is accepting of its approach to the present-day 
issue of device encryption. This acceptance of its resilient security-minded approach is 
likely a product of the country’s shared military service and excellence in the field of 
cyber. No concerns or controversies are voiced about exceptional access by the prime 
minister, members of the Knesset, or other political leaders in the country. The 
population, a significant number of whom are involved in burgeoning high technology 
fields, remains silent on the methods used by the Israel Police and the subject of 
exceptional access at large.  
No indication can be seen that technology companies like Apple have any 
obligations placed on them to assist with exceptional access; nor have companies publicly 
articulated complaints if such demands were made of them. Quite the opposite; Apple has 
invested over $1.2B in Israel, and opened a research and development center in Herzliya, 
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where it employs over 800 local hardware and software engineers on its emerging 
products.197 Scholars have indicated that Israel’s streamlined regulatory framework may 
be a factor in the assistance it receives from the private sector.198 No evidence has been 
found to support such a claim, but it is not an unreasonable assumption.  
Israel received high rankings in categories used to assess the level of freedom in 
the country, and the country’s government is recognized as being protective of its 
citizens’ civil liberties.199 In an illustration of the Israeli judiciary’s stance on device 
privacy and protection of its citizens’ rights, in June 2017, the Israeli Supreme Court 
ruled that a warrant is necessary to search a device even when consent is given by the 
owner.200 This standard is much higher than that even seen in the United States, where 
only consent is necessary. When pressed by Israel’s attorney general on the issue, the 
court replied that the attorney general should seek a legislative change to the law if he 
believed it was an issue.201  
Even in the face of the Israel Supreme Court challenge, no indication can be seen 
that Israel intends to change its present course on its encryption approach. It stands to 
reason that concerns, debates, or attempts to change laws in Israel relative to exceptional 
access have not occurred because the government is comfortable with the position in 
which it finds itself. The Israel Police’s cybercrime unit has adequate solutions to 
encryption: an established approach, which harnesses the expertise of the centralized 
forensic unit, supported by a network of officers across the country, and strong 
partnerships to bolster their efforts. These solutions are accepted by its populous and 
persevere because the approach is consistent with the country’s sociocultural mindset of 
security and resilience.  
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IV. ENCRYPTION POLICY IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 
Article 18: Telecommunications operators and Internet service providers 
shall provide technical interfaces, decryption and other technical support 
assistance to public security organs and state security organs conducting 
prevention and investigation of terrorist activities in accordance with 
law.202 
—China’s Counter-Terrorism Law (2015) 
 
The People’s Republic of China (China), like Israel, has moved on from the 
debate over exceptional access to encrypted data on devices.203 As discussed in the last 
chapter, Israel’s approach is a product of its sociocultural security environment and it 
relies on the resources and skills of its cybercrime unit and strategic partnerships in the 
country. This chapter explores and analyzes China’s approach to encryption. China’s 
cyber forensic efforts are nascent and its approach is more reliant upon regulation and a 
legal framework to compel exceptional access. Digital evidence was not formally 
accepted as legal evidence in China until 2012.204 For those instances in which the 
government needs access to encrypted data on a device, China’s regulations and laws, 
and specifically its 2015 counter-terrorism law, has put companies in a position where 
they are required to provide assistance in extracting data from devices when requested. 
Like Israel, China has its own cybersecurity partnerships and a centralized forensic effort. 
However, based on China’s decision to pass the 2015 counter-terrorism law on the issue, 
those efforts would appear to be secondary to compulsion. In addition, it is important to 
note that China also has a government with a questionable human rights record preceding 
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and during judicial proceedings. This topic is discussed briefly within this chapter, as it 
provides some context and questions to its law enforcement efforts.  
A. THE POLITICAL DESIGN OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND ITS 
IMPACT ON ENCRYPTION 
The government organs of China consist of the National People’s Congress 
(NPC), the President, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme 
People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorates, and local level governments and 
courts.205 The government is legally empowered by the country’s constitution. The 
Constitution of China was adopted on December 4, 1982, and has had some amendments 
since that time.206 The constitution gives noteworthy support to China’s ruling party, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP came to power in 1949 and has 73 million 
members, which makes it the biggest political party in the world.207 The party exerts 
influence over the government through its political bureau, the Politburo, with most 
decisions being made or approved by a smaller group within the organization, the 
Politburo Standing Committee. Their status in the country, and the legitimacy afforded to 
them by the constitution, give them the ability to control the people and policies of China 
tightly. The focus of this control is on propping up the CCP and is reflected heavily in the 
constitution.  
Perusing the Constitution of China, within the preamble and its first articles, the 
ideals and priorities of the country are evident. In the initial preamble of the constitution, 
the framers state, “the Communist Party of China…ultimately, in 1949, overthrew the 
rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism, won the great victory of the 
new-democratic revolution and founded the People’s Republic of China.”208 The 
constitution opens its statutory articles with, “The People’s Republic of China is a 
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socialist state…The socialist system is the basic system of the People’s Republic of 
China. Sabotage of the socialist system by any organization or individual is 
prohibited.”209 Leading the chief set of laws of China, it is clear that that the interests of 
the party are of preeminent consideration. This focus on the party is in stark contrast to 
many countries in the world, including Israel and the United States, which put the rights 
of their citizens before government power. This distinction is important to recognize, 
since many activities that would otherwise be considered criminal, or even civilly 
disobedient, could be interpreted instead as terrorist in nature if the aim of the activity 
was perceived to undermine the CCP. It was not until 2004 that an amendment added 
language to the constitution recognizing, “the State protects and preserves human 
rights.”210 Even with this amendment, widespread reports of repression of political 
dissent and religious freedom are still common, as well as abuses of human rights. 
Reports and investigations on the issue focus on law enforcement, which is ultimately the 
group responsible for the forensic extraction of encrypted data in the country.  
B. STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS TO ENCRYPTED DATA EXTRACTION 
The law enforcement apparatus in China is drawn from two organs, the Ministry 
of Public Security (MPS) and Ministry of State Security (MSS). Police efforts in China 
are centralized, like Israel, and unlike the decentralized nature of law enforcement 
organizations in the United States. The MPS falls under the State Council and is tasked 
with maintaining the country’s domestic public security, comparable to the work of the 
many law enforcement organizations of the United States. The public security role 
includes investigating and deterring criminal and terrorist activities. It is vertically 
structured along with its subordinate organizations as follows in Figure 1.  
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State Council  
| 
Ministry of Public Security 
| 
Bureau of Public Security (at provincial level) 
| 
Division of Public Security (at regional level) 
| 
Substation of Public Security (at county or urban district level) 
| 
Dispatch post of Public Security (at urban neighborhood and rural area level) 
Figure 1.  Law Enforcement Structure in China211 
1. Forensic Units 
The MPS itself consists of 13 bureaus and several support entities, including three 
research institutes. Part of MPS’s domestic responsibilities is forensic device data 
extraction and is the centralized agency overseeing the task. “[In 2000] the MPS 
established the Public Information Network Security Supervision Bureau to deal with 
cybercrime investigation, during which a department responsible for computer forensic 
examination was established in the college of MPS.”212 The acceptance of digital 
evidence in judicial proceedings is relatively new, with official initiation in courts in 
March 2012.213 Device data extraction is also handled in the police bureaus at the 
provincial level, which have the responsibility of, “conduct[ing] forensic/criminalistics 
analysis of the evidence submitted by the local police stations.”214 This construct is 
similar to the description of the structure of forensic efforts in Israel.  
                                                 
211 Source: Obi N. I. Ebbe, Comparative and International Criminal Justice Systems: Policing, 
Judiciary, and Corrections, 3rd ed. (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013), 174. 
212 Chow et al., “Understanding Computer Forensics Requirements in China via the “Panda Burning 
Incense” Virus Case,” 52. 
213 Chow et al., 51. 
214 Ebbe, Comparative and International Criminal Justice Systems, 175. 
 61 
2. Partnerships 
The MPS relies on its private sector for assistance with device data extraction. 
The private and public sector relationships appear to support the priority of the 
government in advancing the goals of the CCP, along with traces to relationships forged 
in military service. As previously discussed, China’s constitution lays out the priorities of 
the country and focuses on sustaining the CCP. Relative to the connection with military 
service, like in Israel, it is compulsory. Article 55 of the constitution states, “It is the 
honourable duty of citizens of the People’s Republic of China to perform military service 
and join the militia in accordance with the law.”215 When Chinese citizens turn 18 years 
old, they are obligated to 24 months of service.216  
On the forensic cybersecurity side, research indicates the MPS works 
predominantly with one particular Chinese cybersecurity company, Meiya Pico. Meiya 
Pico claims to be, “the leading digital forensics and information security products and 
service provider in China, and dominates 45% digital forensic market share [in the 
country].”217 Publications document the relationship, and photographs within those 
publications show MPS officials using Meiya Pico products.218 The forensic capabilities 
of Meiya Pico to extract encrypted data from devices are not as prolific or sophisticated 
as those of Cellebrite, at least in the Android operating system environment. According to 
one study, “Cellebrite is the first company in the mobile forensic industry to develop its 
unique solution for Android devices. Cellebrite’s physical extraction method can bypass 
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more than 200 locks of any types for Android devices.”219 Meiya Pico claims to have 
advanced capabilities on its own website but data to support this ability is lacking.220  
Additional relationships to other cybersecurity firms for the purposes of data 
extraction may exist but do not appear to be as prominent as the one with Meiya Pico. 
Deputy Minister of Public Security of China. Meng Hongwei spoke to strengthening the 
public and private sector relationships worldwide in a 2017 speech during an INTERPOL 
conference. During the conference, he spoke to facilitating information sharing between 
the sectors in areas of prevention, response, and assistance.221 The Deputy Minister’s 
statement is in line with the relationship that already exists between the government and 
Huawei, a leading Chinese-based mobile device manufacturer. In June and July 2017, 
Huawei surpassed Apple in global smartphone sales and only trailed Samsung in market 
shares.222 Huawei already has partnerships with the MPS, which supports its Public 
Security Traffic Management Science Institute.223 In 2011, one U.S. report highlighted 
Chinese government payments in excess of $228 million to Huawei for research and 
development.224 Furthermore, Ref Zhengfei, the founder and CEO of Huawei, was a 
member of the People’s Liberation Army, where he was a military engineer.225 Huawei 
Board Chairwoman Sun Yufang previously worked for the Ministry of State Security.226 
In fact, the U.S. Department of Commerce blocked a Huawei bid for a national 
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emergency wireless project in the United States due to concerns about the relationship the 
company has with the Chinese government.227  
These relationships extend beyond Chinese-based companies. Even Cisco, a U.S.-
based technology company, has been party to a lawsuit in a U.S. District Court in which 
it was accused of, “willingly and knowingly provid[ing] Chinese officials with 
technology and training to access private internet communications, identify anonymous 
web log (“blog”) authors, prevent the broadcast and dissemination of peaceful 
speech.”228 After the lawsuit was filed in the United States, one of the named plaintiffs 
was detained and interrogated by the Ministry of Public Security.229  
The relationships the Chinese government has with the private sector appear to 
have a strong foundation based in a relationship structure designed by the government. 
However, despite these relationships and the capabilities of MPS and some of the 
forensic capabilities of companies like Meiya Pico, the government appears to have been 
more in favor of legislating compliance than overcoming technological hurdles. Its 
policies towards encrypted data fall into this category.  
C. ENCRYPTION POLICY IN CHINA 
Due to the strong influence of the government, as explained in the previous 
section, Chinese processes are driven almost entirely by state organizations.230 The 
Chinese government exerts control over processes like encryption through the use of laws 
developed by these state organizations. These controls are in addition to criminal laws 
that are germane to the encryption discussion. To cover device encryption policy in China 
properly, these relevant areas are examined in the following sections.  
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1. Regulation of Encryption 
China is not a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, but does have stringent 
regulations when encryption is the core function of manufactured software or hardware. 
China began regulation of encryption in 1999 under State Council Order Number 273, 
“Regulation of Commercial Encryption Codes.”231 The order set forth general rules and 
licensing, regulations of research, production, sales, and use, and the associated penalties 
for non-compliance.232 Specifically, it defined encryption products regulated within the 
order as those, “products and technologies used in the encoding protection or security 
certification of information that is not part of state Encryption.”233 It also designated the 
appropriate government regulatory authorities as the State Encryption Management 
Bureau and the Office of State Commercial Cryptography Administration (OSCCA).234  
The composition of the 1999 order, and broad definition of pertinent encryption 
products, allowed for the function of a broad interpretation and application of the law. 
The OSCCA subsequently issued clarification on issues relating to the implementation of 
commercial encryption. The OSCCA stated the rationale behind their updated guidance 
as a result of, “The relevant departments of the Chinese Government [that] are mindful of 
the concerns felt in commercial circles in some countries with regard to the [Regulation 
of Encryption Codes].”235 The OSCCA indicated that software and hardware whose core 
function was encryption were to be regulated while information and communication 
technology (ICT) products that applied encryption, like cellular phones or laptops, would 
                                                 
231 State Council Order Number 273 has been translated in research as either, “Regulation of 
Commercial Encryption Codes,” or “Regulations for the Administration of Commercial Administration.” 
No substantive differences exist within the translation of the articles that follow the different titles. 
ChinaECLaw, Issues Relating to the Administration of Commercial Encryption (Beijing: ChinaECLaw, 
2000), http://www.chinaeclaw.com/english/law/eclaw127.pdf; “Regulation of Commercial Encryption 
Codes,” Asian Legal Information Institute, accessed August 12, 2017, http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/ 
cen/laws/rocec383/. 
232 Asian Legal Information Institute, “Regulation of Commercial Encryption Codes.” 
233 Asian Legal Information Institute.  
234 Asian Legal Information Institute.  
235 ChinaECLaw, Issues Relating to the Administration of Commercial Encryption. 
 65 
not fall within the scope of this order.236 Some researchers pointed out, “these statements 
did not amend the Encryption Regulations but rather indicated how the government 
intends to enforce them.”237 Further, they claim that the guidance was issued by a 
subordinate government agency, and that the government’s intentions could change.238 
However, no evidence is available to indicate that the government ever deviated from the 
OSCCA’s stated intentions.  
Since 2000, attempts have been made to include ICT products in encryption 
regulations indirectly, primarily through infrastructure compliance, but most of these 
attempts have all been met by strong international consternation and were eventually 
abandoned by the Chinese government. The most significant and noteworthy attempt 
impacted wireless products. In 2003, China banned 802.11 WiFi due to national security 
concerns. This ban was significant, because the government attempted to force 
companies to accommodate only a wireless local area network (WLAN) authentication 
and privacy infrastructure (WAPI) encryption technique. The United States Trade 
Representative’s (U.S.T.R.) 2004 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance and a 
letter from U.S.T.R. Zoellick, U.S. Secretary of State Powell, and other U.S. 
administration officials articulated concern about China’s course of action.239 In April 
2004, following trade discussions with the U.S.T.R., Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi 
announced the government would indefinitely postpone the WAPI standard as a result of 
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U.S. pressure.240 This postponement did not occur before Apple complied, and 
introduced an iPhone model supporting both WiFi and WAPI.241 This episode is relevant 
for two reasons. First, it illustrates China’s continued attempts to control the type of 
encryption its citizens are able to access in the non-commercial arena. Second, it shows 
the willingness of a multinational corporation like Apple to acquiesce to the demands of 
the Chinese government.  
So far, encryption-specific regulation in China has remained a matter of industrial 
policy. China has floated draft legislation for comment on multiple occasions requiring 
source code for ICT products to be submitted for review.242 Possessing the source code 
would not allow for decryption, but would assist the government in moving more quickly 
to that end. Facing this opposition, China has opted to address the issue directly by 
passing a law to compel companies to assist with decryption (discussed in the following 
section).  
2. Laws Directly Impacting Device Encryption and Exceptional Access 
As encryption concerns returned to the forefront of the international agenda over 
the past three years, China’s National People’s Congress made the decision to legislate 
directly on the issue. The government’s actions on encryption have set China apart from 
countries across the world.  
In December 2015, the government enacted the Counter-Terrorism Law of the 
Peoples Republic of China. A draft version released in 2014 contained language that 
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would have required telecommunications companies to install backdoors and provide 
encryption keys. No country’s government had taken such an extreme stance on 
exceptional access other than the United States during the Crypto Wars in the 1990s. The 
draft legislation stated, “Telecommunications operators and internet service providers 
shall install in the design…and report cryptography schemes to departments responsible 
for encryption for examination.”243 Failure to comply with the law would have resulted 
in the termination of service for companies in China. The final version adopted at the end 
of 2015 lacked the initial language, and instead, included softer language, which made 
the only requirement for companies, “assistance.”244 Article 18 of the enacted law stated:  
Article 18: Telecommunications operators and internet service providers 
shall provide technical interfaces, decryption and other technical support 
assistance to public security organs and state security organs conducting 
prevention and investigation of terrorist activities in accordance with 
law.245 
In response to its passage, Li Shouwei, deputy head of the NPC’s criminal law division 
under the legislative affairs committee stated to local press, “[It] will not affect 
companies’ normal business nor install backdoors to infringe intellectual property rights, 
or ... citizens freedom of speech on the internet and their religious freedom.”246 A literal 
reading of the law indicates that Shouwei’s statements are factually accurate insomuch as 
the law does not call for techniques like key escrow or other means of exceptional access. 
However, the legislation still calls for technical assistance and decryption from 
companies, something no other country has mandated. Further, the stated limitations of 
the law to the investigation of terrorist activity, reiterated by Shouwei in his statement, 
could be disingenuous. As one researcher states, based on the comments of Chinese 
dissident activist Hu Jia, “there is enough scope for creating ‘emergency situations’ in 
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order to restrict the rights of the people or heavily suppress any local dissent.”247 These 
two issues are discussed more comprehensively in the following paragraphs.  
The questions remain, will companies comply with this law and in what 
circumstances will they be called upon? Neither question can be empirically answered at 
this point. If Chinese law enforcement has chosen to call upon the assistance of 
telecommunications companies, neither party has publicly disclosed that information 
based on the research conducted. Both questions can be addressed on a theoretical level 
but even this situation leaves a nebulous understanding of its potential. 
Addressing the latter question, the law was written to counter terrorism, and 
accordingly, the circumstances upon which this law would be used presumably revolve 
around such an act. To that end, the law defines terrorism in Article 3 and states: 
“Terrorism” as used in this Law refers to propositions and actions that 
create social panic, endanger public safety, violate person and property, or 
coerce national organs or international organizations, through methods 
such violence, destruction, intimidation, so as to achieve their political, 
ideological, or other objectives.248 
The definition, especially with the use of the phrase, “other objectives,” and in the 
context of a country that elevates the sanctity of its ruling party to the highest level in 
law, leaves the door open for almost unlimited use. The previously cited analysis draws 
similar conclusions.249  
With regard to compliance, research revealed that no companies publicly stated 
that they would not comply. Further, it is only necessary to look to the historical 
decisions of companies in related areas to know that if called upon, they will likely 
provide whatever assistance is requested. The opportunities for technology adoption and 
consumer growth in China are far too great for any competitive multinational company to 
risk losing business in that country. According to researchers:  
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The Internet was an American invention and it was in the Western context 
that the technology was built and matured, but US users no longer drive 
online developments. China’s online population surpassed that of the 
United States in 2008, and today there are more Chinese Internet users 
than there are Americans on the planet. With more than half the Chinese 
population still offline, this shift in the Internet’s centre of gravity is likely 
to continue to accelerate over the next decade.250 
Companies like Apple already showed a willingness to comply in 2006 when China 
required wireless devices to be WAPI compliant. In fact, Apple CEO Tim Cook was 
recently quoted as saying, “like we do in other countries, we follow the law wherever we 
do business.”251 This comment was relative to a decision by Apple to remove virtual 
private network (VPN) applications from its online stores in July 2017 at the request of 
the Chinese government. An October letter from Senators Ted Cruz and Patrick Leahy 
questioned this decision.252 This latest move by Apple to meet the legal requirements of 
China came on the heels of its decision to open up local data centers in China to comply 
with an additional Chinese cyber law that went into effect on June 1, 2017 that required 
online data of its citizens to be stored within Chinese territory.253  
Multiple sources have reported that Apple is not alone in its willingness to meet 
China’s demands. Microsoft released a similar statement in 2014, stating, “Microsoft 
complies with the laws and regulations of every market in which we operate around the 
world…Our business practices in China are designed to be compliant with Chinese 
law.”254 In 2005, Microsoft shut down the blog of a Chinese free speech advocate.255 In 
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2006, Microsoft, Google, Cisco, and Yahoo representatives appeared in a congressional 
hearing to answer questions about their questionable collaboration with the Chinese 
government.256 In 2014, LinkedIn debuted in China with the caveat that users’ 
information displayed in that country may be filtered based on content.257 These are only 
some of the examples of ongoing compliance due to what some have cited as the Chinese 
government using, “its country’s vast market at leverage over American technology 
companies.”258 While reports of companies capitulating to the Chinese government’s 
counter-terrorism law have not surfaced recently, it is reasonable to surmise that these 
same companies would take similar actions if called upon to assist.  
3. Stored Information Laws in China 
The Criminal Procedure Law of China was initially adopted in 1979, with 
amendments in 1996 and 2012. Some argue it was done in haste, and the country should 
have been more deliberative in its establishment of criminal laws and procedure.259 The 
basis of criminal law in China can be found in the Constitution and its criminal procedure 
law. Within those areas, this section looks at the content and implementation of search 
and seizure laws, as well as those affecting electronic evidence to understand the 
encryption policy of China better.  
The basis of law in China is rooted in its Constitution. As previously discussed, 
the focus of the Constitution is on preserving government and the socialist party. It is 
important to note that Article 5 of China’s Constitution states that the Constitution and 
China’s laws take precedence over all individuals. The only reference to search and 
seizure falls within articles 37 and 39, which references searches of people and homes, 
respectively. An actual search of a person, as stipulated in Article 37, is almost an after-
                                                 
256 Parker. 
257 Parker. 
258 Paul Mozur, “China Tries to Extract Pledge of Compliance from U.S. Tech Firms,” New York 
Times, September 17, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/technology/china-tries-to-extract-
pledge-of-compliance-from-us-tech-firms.html. 
259 Baosheng Zheng, Reflecting on Development of Evidence Law in China (Boston: Boston 
University, 2015), 5, https://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2015/03/Baosheng-Zhang-Reflecting-on-Development-
of-Evidence-Law-in-China.pdf. 
 71 
thought as it states at the ends of the law, “and unlawful search of the person of citizens is 
prohibited.”260 This article is most comparable to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution but lacks the substance and parameters found in U.S. jurisprudence.  
The criminal procedure law provides the basis for criminal law in China. The 
Criminal Procedure Law of 2012 includes general provisions about evidence, protocols 
for filing a case and investigation, as well as trial procedures and special procedures. 
Within Part II, Chapter II, Sections 5 and 6 are the guidelines for searches and seizures 
during criminal investigations. Unlike legal rules set forth in the United States, the 
sections briefly lay out these protocols. In Section 5, which pertains to searches, Article 
134 states, “In order to collect criminal evidence and track down an offender, 
investigators may search the person, belongings and residence of the criminal suspect and 
anyone who might be hiding a criminal or criminal evidence.”261 Article 136 states, 
“When a search is to be conducted, a search warrant must be shown to the person to be 
searched. If an emergency occurs when an arrest or detention is being made, a search 
may be conducted without a search warrant.”262 Within the sections pertaining to 
evidence, language supports procedures relative to electronic evidence added in 2012. 
Article 48 of Chapter 5 states, “All materials that prove the facts of a case shall be 
evidence. Evidence shall include…audio-visual materials, and electronic data.”263 Article 
52 further stipulates, “The physical evidence, documentary evidence, audio-visual 
materials, electronic data and other evidence gathered by administrative organs during 
administrative law enforcement and case investigation and handling may be used as 
evidence in criminal cases.”264 Amongst the evidence guidelines are also exclusionary 
rules, which have not always been present in Chinese law.  
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The laws protecting information stored on devices in China are, in appearance, 
similar to those in the United States under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. Citizens of China have legal protections set forth in the constitution and 
criminal procedure law. In this way, the legal structure of criminal law in China is similar 
to the United States on a superficial level. 
4. Political and Religious Repression and Human Rights Abuses 
A conversation about the legal protections of Chinese citizens should also include 
the lack of protections people have in practice. The government of China has a record of 
political and religious repression and human rights transgressions.265 Many of these have 
been documented as being carried out by the Ministry of Public Safety.266  
According to Amnesty International, over the past year, China continued to 
systematically monitor, harass, intimidate, detain, and arrest political and religious 
activists.267 Numerous examples have been documented and include the arrest and 
conviction of activist Zhai Yanmin for subverting state power, the detention of pro-
democracy acitivists Jiang Yefei and Dong Guangping, and the arrests and convictions of 
pastors Bao Guohua and his wife, Xing Wenxiang, who had been vocal in preventing the 
removal of crosses from churches, for gathering a crowd to disturb social order.268  
Actions authorized by the counter-terrorism law raise additional concerns. 
“Religious repression conducted under ‘anti-separatism’ or ‘counter-terrorism’ 
campaigns remained particularly severe in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and in 
Tibetan-populated areas.”269 Human Rights Watch (HRW) documents similar instances 
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in its 2016 World Report and also highlights more severe human rights infractions.270 In 
fact, HRW responded to initial drafts of the counter-terrorism bill by stating that  
the law would legitimate ongoing human rights violations and facilitate 
future abuses, especially in an environment lacking basic legal protections 
for criminal suspects and a history of gross human rights abuses 
committed in the name of counterterrorism. Such violations are evident 
across the country and particularly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, the region that has been most affected by acts of terrorism and 
political violence in recent years.271 
Further, HRW and other groups present empirical evidence linking political 
repression and human rights abuses to law enforcement. In 2008, the United Nations 
Committee against Torture concluded, “notwithstanding the State party’s efforts to 
address the practice of torture and related problems in the criminal justice system, the 
Committee remains deeply concerned about the continued allegations…of routine and 
widespread use of torture and ill-treatment of suspects in police custody.”272 HRW 
conducted comprehensive research of over 400 verdicts in the first quarter of 2014. Their 
analysis showed that, “police torture and ill-treatment of suspects in pre-trial detention 
remains a serious concern.”273 They also found, “Former detainees described physical 
and psychological torture during police interrogations, including being hung by the 
wrists, being beaten with police batons or other objects, and prolonged sleep 
deprivation.”274 The U.S. State Department states:  
Despite legal protections [afforded by the constitution], authorities often 
do not respect the privacy of citizens in practice. Although the law 
requires warrants before law enforcement officials can search premises, 
this provision frequently has been ignored; moreover, the Public Security 
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Bureau and the procuratorate can issue search warrants on their own 
authority.275 
The reported abuses referenced previously are of particular concern as they apply to the 
MPS, which is the authority responsible for issues of device encryption. Based on the 
guidelines of the law, MPS personnel will likely be calling telecommunications operators 
and internet service providers for decryption assistance in the name of terrorism, as they 
choose to define the term. At this point, no evidence has indicated that the law has been 
used to compel decryption assistance to support political or religious repression or human 
rights abuses. However, it is worth noting that Article 90 of the Counter-Terrorism Law 
of 2015 includes verbiage restricting many reporting details of terrorist incidents and 
counter-terrorism responses; failure to follow this guidance results in specified fines and 
detention.276 This section of the law, along with other policies of state controlled 
information flow within China, makes it unlikely that open reporting on the utilization of 
the decryption assistance clause will occur.  
Based on the analysis of the United Nations, HRW, and Amnesty International, 
although the laws of China appear to offer protection for civil liberties like those of the 
United States, the reality is much more grim. Unlike Israel and the United States, China 
received low rankings from the independent watchdog organization, Freedom House, in 
categories used to assess civil liberties in the country.277 The ratings contribute to the 
overall opinion that the country is not free. The Chinese government, using its various 
state organs, will go to extreme lengths to maintain a perception of control, even if it 
means abusing the religious, political, or human rights of its citizens.  
D. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
When presented with the issue of device encryption, China has a centralized, 
structural approach through its forensic unit in the MPS. The government also relies on 
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partnerships with academia and the private sector to bolster Chinese law enforcement’s 
abilities. However, based on China’s decision to pass the Counter-Terrorism Law of 
2015, those structural efforts appear to be secondary to compulsion. China took the 
unprecedented step to require companies legally to assist with decryption, or technical 
support to that end, which is the crux of their approach to encryption.  
China has demonstrated a historical pattern of gaining compliance from 
companies operating in China through legal means, and the counter-terrorism law is 
another step in that direction. Although China has capitulated to international pressure in 
past cases, postponing or suspending passage of potential laws that met with great 
concern or resistance, once these laws are passed, companies have also shown a pattern 
of compliance. The government has learned that companies with a desire to operate in the 
market share China has to offer are willing to abide by laws passed, no matter how 
unreasonable they may be to the values of the companies or critics across the world.  
It is reasonable to conclude that as the government of China matures, it is 
attempting to establish legitimacy through legal frameworks like the criminal procedural 
law, even as it continues to require the ability to access encrypted devices that may 
belong to individuals seen as threats to the government or the socialist party. To maintain 
this appearance, laws like the Counter-Terrorism Law of 2015 are necessary, as they are 
complementary to the already existing frameworks.  
Within this context of law enforcement and encryption, China’s record of 
political, religious, and human rights abuses must be accounted for in this analysis. In 
cases touching political issues or powerful groups, China’s ruling communist party 
maintains instruments to subvert legal and judicial processes.278 According to one 
watchdog organization, “While citizens can expect a degree of fair adjudication in 
nonpolitical cases, those that touch on politically sensitive issues or the interests of 
powerful groups are subject to decisive ‘guidance’ from political-legal committees.”279 
The Counter-Terrorism Law of 2015 strengthens this image of fair adjudication in 
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nonpolitical cases, and may eventually be used to enhance the image of actions in 
politically sensitive ones. Presently, it is more indicative of the Chinese government’s 
continued capacity to exert power over those with whom it has contact when it so 
chooses. The structural features of the Chinese approach, as well as a legal mandate for 
exceptional access, are lacking in the United States. In practice, this legal structure 
provides much less protection for civil liberties than in the United States, while it 
legitimates compelling private companies to provide decryption support to practices that 
repress individual liberty. However, the use of a legal mandate to compel access does not 
automatically trigger the repression of rights, although in China, conceivably this law was 
passed for this very reason.  
These factors are important to consider when assessing a solution to the U.S. 
debate on the issue. Based on comments and actions from telecommunications companies 
operating in China, they appear willing to comply with the legal requirements set forth by 
the government. It is possible that in the face of legal pressure, the same response would 
be seen in the United States. The next chapter provides an analysis of both structure and 
legal means to gain exceptional access for the United States based on the lessons learned 
from Israel and China.  
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V. ANALYSIS OF ENCRYPTION POLICY IN ISRAEL AND 
CHINA FOR U.S. IMPLEMENTATION 
The Master said, When I walk along with two others, they may serve me 
as my teachers. I will select their good qualities and follow them, their bad 
qualities and avoid them.280 
—Confucius 
 
The previous two chapters comprehensively covered the approaches to device 
encryption in Israel and China. The two approaches have some similarities in the 
structure of their centralized law enforcement efforts. However, Israel appears to be 
content with the abilities and partnerships of its cybercrime unit, while China has taken 
the additional to step to pass legislation compelling assistance from telecommunications 
providers. These approaches present two options for examination for the U.S. 
government, which still seeks a definitive solution for the general issue of encryption.281  
Building on the prior two chapters’ cases studies of Israeli and Chinese decryption 
policies, this chapter evaluates potential implementation of the policies of Israel and 
China in the United States. For each country, the chapter utilizes qualitative analysis to 
assess applicability by four criteria: legality, cost, political acceptance, and the potential 
for success for application within the United States. The focus is on what each country’s 
primary approach to the encryption issue can offer for reconciling debate over U.S. 
policy. 
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A. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISRAELI 
APPROACH IN THE UNITED STATES  
The Israeli approach to device encryption is addressed through forensic extraction 
by the Israel Police cybercrime unit, which has strong partnerships, built on a national 
consensus of security. It represents a unified, active effort by Israeli law enforcement to 
access data that would be otherwise untouchable through preexisting vulnerabilities. The 
assessment of the Israeli approach focuses on forensic extraction through the 
implementation in the United States of a structural solution like the federal cybercrime 
unit that exists in Israel. The results of the analysis are used to determine the viability of a 
specific proposal to create a capacity with similar characteristics in the United States.  
The cybercrime unit in Israel is an entity under a unified command of the Israel 
Police, in which a centralized forensic laboratory specializes in extraction with a network 
of cyber officers throughout Israel serving individual communities. Two key differences 
between Israel and the United States must be accounted for prior to an analysis for 
proposed adoption, size and law enforcement structure. Israel is significantly smaller than 
the United States in both population and geography. Israel also has one police force, 
whereas the United States has hundreds of federal, state, and local law enforcement 
entities. As a result, any U.S. option that attempts to replicate characteristics of the Israeli 
approach will need to scale up to account appropriately for size, and consider a task force 
structure to accommodate a difference in law enforcement structure, since neither of 
those U.S. factors will realistically change. 
With these two key differences taken into account, the following discussion 
assesses the applicability of the Israeli model in the United States on the basis of the four 
criteria of legality, cost, political acceptance, and the potential for success in its 
application. 
1. Legality  
In evaluating the constitutional and legal implications for implementation of 
Israel’s approach within the United States, no known legal barriers exist to the formation 
of a cybercrime unit focusing exclusively on encrypted data extraction from devices.  
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Some federal and local law enforcement agencies in the United States already 
have laboratories with device data extraction capabilities. In fact, both the FBI and the 
Secret Service maintain forensic laboratories across the country with a general focus on 
cyber forensics. The FBI coordinates about 16 RCFLs through the national RCFL 
program with a coordinating program office in Washington, DC.282 The Secret Service 
maintains approximately 40 ECTFs around the country, each with a forensic lab in the 
field office from which the respective ECTFs operate.283 These ECTFs are discussed in 
greater detail in the conclusion of this thesis, in light of the analysis of this chapter.  
The formation of a singular, centralized unit, and any formal partnerships it has 
with academia and the private sector, would require agreements and memoranda of 
understanding between government departments and agencies, state and local law 
enforcement departments, businesses, and academic institutions. These would be 
administrative measures, not necessarily authorized by law, to allow the entities to work 
together and maintain respective equities.  
The goal of these labs would be to defeat any barriers to device data extraction 
like encryption. The forensic techniques that might be utilized in these labs could give 
pause to prosecutors and judges. An argument has been put forth that in the United 
States, encrypted data extraction, known in some cases as ethical hacking, will require 
legislative changes and greater oversight. One researcher stated, “I recommend that 
policymakers adopt legislative actions to legalize and thereby legitimize hacking by law 
enforcement in limited cases as a middle-ground solution.”284 New legislation however 
may not be needed. In fact, many U.S. law enforcement agencies already partner with a 
                                                 
282 “About,” Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory, accessed January 18, 2018, https://www.rcfl. 
gov/about. 
283 “Investigation,” United States Secret Service, accessed August 17, 2017, https://www.secretservi 
ce.gov/investigation/. 
284 Nguyen, “Lawful Hacking,” 68.  
 80 
company like Cellebrite to extract encrypted information from devices, which runs 
counter to this postulate calling for legislative change.285  
The strongest legal argument in opposition to this approach that could be found is 
less legislatively based and more procedurally based. The District Attorney’s Office in 
Manhattan argued in a white paper on the subject of device encryption that data obtained 
through hacking may be difficult to introduce as evidence: 
Introducing into evidence data that has been obtained through hacking or 
other means not provided by the operating system manufacturer may be 
more difficult than introducing into evidence data that is obtained through 
a process that was designed by the smartphone manufacturer or operating 
system supplier, because there may be significant questions about the 
authenticity, integrity and completeness of the information that has been 
obtained through hacking.286  
While this argument has some level of merit, it does not preclude the Israeli approach or 
ethical hacking on a legal basis. The introduction of forensic techniques and evidence 
almost always requires testimony on the part of a forensic examiner. Accreditation of 
these labs and their methods would also help to ease this burden.  
A stronger argument supporting the approach can be found by extrapolating from 
existing law. A mobile device is a storage medium within which potential evidence of a 
crime may be located. The DOJ is extremely clear about this fact in its opinions in 
reference to obtaining electronic evidence.287 It is comparable to a private residence, in 
which items of evidentiary value are stored. In the United States, for the government to 
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gain access and search a property belonging to an individual where a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is protected by the Fourth Amendment, a few conditions must be 
met. These conditions, outlined under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, include obtaining a lawful warrant from a duly sworn magistrate; to do so, an 
investigator must show probable cause that it contains evidence of a crime.288 Once that 
lawful warrant is obtained, few limits are placed on agents of the government as to how 
they enter that house.289 They can knock on the door or they can cut a hole in the side of 
the house if they find that the common points of entry are impenetrable. The same is true 
of an electronic storage device. Once a warrant is obtained, the method law enforcement 
uses to gain access is reasonably without bounds.290 Little difference exists between 
whether an officer takes notes and photos sifting through applications on a device, as any 
other user would, or a forensic examiner makes an image of the data or gains access 
through a technique like chip-off forensics, Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) forensics, 
cold booting, or forcing an unencrypted backup to access data on a locked cell phone. As 
long as the government adheres to the guidelines of the search warrant, a high degree of 
equivalency exists. No legislative fixes or additional oversight are necessary to alter a 
proven, well-adjudicated process.  
In fact, additional protections are offered by the Sixth Amendment as it applies to 
this approach.291 The Sixth Amendment states, “the accused…shall enjoy the right…to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with witnesses 
against him.”292 As a result of this amendment, for any evidence obtained from an 
encrypted device, the government must be prepared to testify to it. Presumably, this 
responsibility of expert testimony in this instance would fall to the forensic examiner who 
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accessed the device. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence prescribes requirements 
for those giving such testimony.293 The forensic examiner may be called upon to attest to 
the evidence being presented, and may even have to explain the technique used. In a way, 
it is an oversight process of ethical hacking.  
Based on this analysis, no legal barriers appear to exist to standing up a 
centralized forensic unit to extract information from an electronic device. Federal 
interagency task forces already exist in cities throughout the country without any 
authorizing legislation. Extracting encrypted information on select devices happens on a 
regular basis with equipment or assistance from the Israeli-based company, Cellebrite.294 
In fact, an argument can be made that the encryption issue is already being addressed 
through contracts with companies like Cellebrite. However, this dependent approach 
lacks efficiency, good stewardship of taxpayer dollars, and the ability to be adopted 
universally and equitably throughout the country. 
2. Cost 
Cost of the implementation of Israel’s approach to encryption is assessed on two 
levels, the anticipated impact on U.S. taxpayers vis-à-vis government expenditures and 
repercussions for U.S. businesses.  
a. Impact on U.S. Taxpayers 
U.S. taxpayers are spending millions of dollars for federal, state, and local agencies 
on solutions to device data extraction. Federal agencies like the FBI partner with Cellebrite, 
the company that has cornered the market on extracting encrypted data, and have spent 
millions of dollars on contracts with them. According to one source, since 2007, over $40M 
has been obligated to Cellebrite from the federal government.295 Meanwhile, Table 2 shows 
money paid by 20 states to Cellebrite for products from 2010 through 2016.  
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Table 2.   Monies Paid by 20 State Police Agencies to Cellebrite 
from 2010–2016.296 












New Hampshire $47,886 
New Jersey $218,867 
New Mexico $33,390 
North Carolina $158,099 
North Dakota $47,948 
Ohio $75,659 





As Table 2 illustrates, hundreds of thousands of dollars are being spent by these 
states on device extraction assistance. However, the alleged cost to unlock an individual 
phone or obtain an annual subscription is not within most local and state police 
departments’ budgets. According to one source, the cost to unlock an iPhone is $1,500 
and an annual subscription can be as much as $250,000.297 This price is consistent with 
the research of federal government contract actions for comparable amounts. Reviewing 
the previously referenced data from contracts between Cellebrite and the Department of 
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Homeland Security (DHS), a two-year, “Forensic Extraction Device Award,” was 
fulfilled at a cost of $448,087.298  
Centralizing these decryption efforts under one U.S. unit specializing in device 
data extraction could be a significant benefit to the taxpayer. Costs associated with this 
venture will be incurred, and they may initially exceed current amounts being spent on 
companies like Cellebrite during the implementation of a new forensic program. 
However, in the same way that many local and municipal law enforcement organizations 
obtain forensic assistance from state-run laboratories to save on the costs of having their 
own independent forensic resources, decryption and extraction efforts from one 
centralized unit could eventually yield similar benefits.  
While Congress need not statutorily authorize the centralized U.S. cybercrime 
unit described, it will still require appropriations. As mentioned previously, initial costs 
could be significant before normalizing. The services, should they be provided under 
federal leadership to state and local partners, will attract federal money; an area in which 
partnerships will be critical. The unit, like Israel’s, should be able to derive its knowledge 
on decryption and data extraction from law enforcement specialists, U.S. businesses, and 
academia, instead of a multinational cybersecurity business like Cellebrite. Even if 
forensic experts deem the products of a company like Cellebrite too valuable to break this 
relationship, centralizing tools from such a company in designated federal facilities could 
be advantageous. Making these tools available to state and local departments through 
smaller regional laboratories, instead of paying for hardware and software subscriptions 
themselves, would likely be a cheaper and more effective option to the current 
decentralized efforts.  
Funding sources, mechanisms, and motivation to direct monies to cyber 
challenges are already present in the United States. A forensic task force will likely cause 
much of the money being directed to companies like Cellebrite to remain in the country, 
as the knowledge base of such a unit increases in the area of decryption and extraction. 
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This approach could also ease any fiscal burden on state and local police departments that 
choose to seek their own solutions unilaterally.  
b. Impact on U.S. Businesses 
The cost to U.S. businesses is another factor that must be considered with this 
approach. The Israeli approach provides a solution that may benefit U.S. businesses. A 
dedicated law enforcement unit focused on breaking the encryption of devices will force 
companies to stay on the cutting edge of encryption technology. According to the 
vulnerabilities equities process, once the government uncovers a vulnerability, the 
circumstances and vulnerability are presented to a board of government agency 
representatives where a determination is typically made to disclose its existence to the 
affected company.299 Assuming a determination is made to alert the company, it will 
allow the company to patch or prevent an exploit from being used again. This approach 
creates a cycle of improvement and innovation.300 The company will benefit financially 
by being able to tout its ability to keep its user information safe following the discovery 
of vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, technologists argue that this method will also ultimately 
benefit a forensic unit, as it will have to adapt and increase its knowledge base once the 
exploit is secured.301 In addition, it is also possible that such a relationship will increase 
cooperation between the private and public sectors. Either way, such an approach seems 
unlikely to hurt U.S. businesses.  
On a more speculative level, should a forensic unit in the United States 
successfully leverage the talent of those in academia as it does in Israel, U.S. companies 
stand to benefit if those workers migrated to the private sector. The advantages that U.S. 
companies would reap from enhanced technological developments and innovative 
projects of skilled workers who join the workforce following hands-on experiences in 
academic institutions that partnered with the government could be significant. For 
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example, the NSA already takes advantage of such partnerships with its National Centers 
of Academic Excellence in Cyber Operations Program, touting these collaborations as 
accelerating mission solutions, and many NSA alumni have gone on to make a significant 
impact in the private sector.302 
The costs associated with the Israeli approach are likely to break even with 
current expenditures with the probability of benefiting U.S. businesses and economy. It is 
likely that initial start-up costs for law enforcement to access devices should hold steady 
with the possibility of increasing as a forensic unit is stood up. However, like most 
ventures, these costs should level following their establishment, and the centralization of 
efforts should benefit an untold number of federal, state, and local organizations. The 
approach has the potential to benefit U.S. companies in a few areas, and with the money 
for decryption remaining in the country, the overall benefit to the economy should also be 
positive.  
The degree and nature of achieved cost efficiencies within government and 
benefits to private businesses depends on the details of how a forensic task force is 
organized and implemented. While the preceding assessment identifies several 
opportunities for savings and benefits, careful analysis of these factors is a necessary step 
in the further development of this option.  
3. Political Acceptance 
Political acceptance of the Israeli approach is evaluated on the expected reception 
of two groups, the legislative branch and the U.S. population. Acceptance by the 
legislative branch can be measured by the likelihood of approval or willingness to initiate 
legislative action based on previously exhibited behavior. The expected reception of the 
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U.S. population can be assessed through previously administered public opinion polls on 
related issues.  
a. The Legislative Branch 
The U.S. Congress is constantly tackling significant issues like cybersecurity or 
encryption. Chairman Michael McCaul attempted to create a more unified and 
operational approach to cybersecurity in the DHS over the past two years with his 
legislation, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act.303 Notably, a 
search of current and past legislation indicates no efforts have been made to authorize 
statutorily a centralized forensic task force unit modeled after the Israeli system. 
However, a lack of authorization does not prohibit someone from operating under 
existing laws, which may be the most politically appealing aspect of a U.S. cybercrime 
unit. The Secret Service’s National Computer Forensic Institute, for example, only 
received authorizing language in October 2017, but it has been in existence for almost a 
decade, and provides cyber training to state and local law enforcement officers and 
others.  
The formation of a U.S. cybercrime unit would ease the calls for Congress to 
address encryption from privacy and exceptional access advocates alike, because it is a 
solution that helps satisfy both groups’ demands. As previously discussed, the issue of 
exceptional government access has been a topic of discussion on the Hill and in the 
Executive Branch for decades. Some Senators and Congressmen called for greater 
exploration on the matter, while others adamantly opposed government intervention on 
the issue; the Clinton Administration even attempted to provide a solution with the 
controversial Clipper Chip.304 A forensic task force unit would provide a solution 
amenable to all parties in the encryption debate and eliminate the need for further 
congressional action. Technologists in favor of privacy, but respectful of the belief that 
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law enforcement may need to access certain encrypted information, have already made 
the argument for law enforcement to exploit security flaws.305 Those supporting the 
position of exceptional access would likely find satisfaction with the creation of a unit 
focusing solely on encryption and device data extraction, provided access to devices are 
able to be achieved. To be clear, those in support of exceptional access like Manhattan 
District Attorney Vance have made it clear that they would prefer a solution that involves 
industry assistance.306 However, given the present stalemate, the option of hacking 
encryption is also already being exercised unilaterally by the Manhattan DA’s office, 
which is a clear indication it will not be opposed to such actions.307  
The idea of a unified cybercrime unit satisfies many of the encryption arguments 
from both sides of the debate over the past few decades. Since these groups are typically 
the catalyst for Congressional involvement and intervention on the subject, it is 
reasonable to believe that the Israeli model would find acceptance in the legislature. That 
such a task force will not require Congressional statutory authorization or compel access 
using other means makes it even more politically palatable.  
b. The U.S. Population 
Relative to the expected reception of the U.S. population, it is worth revisiting the 
conclusions drawn in Chapter III about Israel. Israel’s sociocultural security environment 
is a key factor in the basis of its device encryption policy. The Israeli population’s shared 
experience in the military and recognition of enemies at its borders establishes a common 
mindset of national security through the Israeli security network. Homogeneity exists in 
thought on subjects of security and counter-terrorism, and these are intrinsic. The 
country’s law enforcement entities are able to take advantage of this mindset in its 
application to criminal investigations and acceptance of their methods.  
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The United States, a country of inhabitants hailing from different cultures, 
countries, and backgrounds, does not have this common thread running through its 
population. As a result, the challenge in the United States is participation and acceptance 
by a population leery of the potential for government overreach and law enforcement’s 
abuse of power. For example, a poll taken in the last five years found the majority of the 
country believes, “that federal courts fail to provide adequate limits on the telephone and 
Internet data the government is collecting as part of its anti-terrorism efforts.”308  
This is not to say that public support for the Israeli approach is unattainable 
because the same level of homogeneity does not exist in areas of security and counter-
terrorism in the United States. This support can be accomplished by highlighting the 
types of criminal cases that will be prioritized like terrorism, homicides, assaults, human 
trafficking, and sexual exploitation. Many of these issues typically transcend cultural 
differences, with terrorism ranking at the top of the U.S. public’s policy priorities in 
2018.309 Law enforcement organizations affiliated with a forensic unit in the United 
States may also need to distance their efforts publicly from the intelligence community. 
Unlike intelligence agencies, the techniques used by law enforcement forensic analysts 
can be scrutinized in court. This level of transparency is a quality that may be more 
amenable to U.S. society, and prompt acceptance and participation behind a common 
cause.  
More importantly, as the world settles into a digital existence, a generation in the 
United States is coming of age that has never lived a day without the internet. Passcode, a 
project started by The Christian Science Monitor in 2014 to provide insight into the 
challenges of the Digital Age, sought out 15 rising stars in cybersecurity under the age of 
15.310 In conducting interviews of these young adults, interviewers found almost all of 
them supported white hat hacking for the betterment of their digital society. “The kids all 
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had a strong sense of ethics—and a desire to create a safer digital future for their 
peers.”311 The potential for the support of the Israeli approach to defeat device encryption 
ethically in the name of altruism may only grow, as the views of the next generation of 
young adults come to dominate public opinion in the United States.  
Through clear messaging and a reasonable framework of the mission of a forensic 
task force unit, and a growing proportion of the populous who understands the 
complications, ethics, and bounds of a digital society, prospects are strong that U.S. 
society will accept and even actively participate in the Israeli model implemented in the 
United States.  
4. Potential for Success 
Based on the literature and research on the subject, success is multi-faceted. First, 
does the method employed resolve the privacy versus exceptional access debate? To 
move on from the debate, this condition must be satisfied. Second, does the method 
employed result in the ability of law enforcement to obtain usable data from a device that 
was once encrypted? This aspect is critical when relying on the structural methods used 
by the Israel Police cybercrime unit.  
a. The Privacy versus Exceptional Access Debate 
The first criterion of success, whether the method employed resolves the privacy 
versus exceptional access debate, is met with the Israeli approach. On the privacy side of 
the debate exists two entities, technologists and civil libertarians. Both technologists and 
civil libertarians want to ensure strong encryption is available and prolific.312 
Technologists believe requisite government access should do nothing to weaken 
encryption, and are therefore generally in favor of a lawful hacking approach.313 Civil 
libertarians support government access to encrypted information if bounded by 
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appropriate checks and balances. The Israeli approach allows for strong encryption, does 
not weaken encryption, does nothing to alter the status quo of the established law, and as 
previously discussed, may even make encryption stronger. On the exceptional access side 
of the debate, the government wants to ensure it is able to access encrypted information 
when it has legitimate law enforcement inquiries.314 The Israeli approach is the vehicle 
for this access, and operating under the assumption that it will be successful, it meets this 
requirement.  
b. The Ability of Law Enforcement to Access Encrypted Information 
To satisfy the second criterion of success, the ability of law enforcement to obtain 
usable data from encrypted devices, many factors must fall into place. There is no reason 
to believe a centralized approach of law enforcement organizations with partnerships in 
the private sector and academia could not be as successful as in Israel. However, the U.S. 
context presents unique challenges and opportunities to achieving the coordination 
necessary for this structural approach.  
Structurally, the fact that the United States does not have a centralized law 
enforcement agency, but many federal, state, and local agencies, will pose the greatest 
structural challenge for organization. Operating under the assumption that this unit would 
not be cause for the creation of a new federal agency, an existing federal law enforcement 
organization would need to lead and gain the support and participation of other federal, 
state, and local law enforcement organizations to be successful. This issue would require 
executive branch leadership. It is also not an insurmountable task, as it was accomplished 
previously with regards to counter-terrorism, with the creation of FBI Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces (JTTFs) under the National JTTF.315 
                                                 
314 Schulze, “Clipper Meets Apple vs. FBI-A Comparison of the Cryptography Discourses from 1993 
and 2016,” 56–57. 
315 “National RCFL Program,” Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory, accessed January 17, 2018, 
https://www.rcfl.gov; “What We Investigate: Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, accessed October 14, 2017, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism/joint-terrorism-task-
forces; “Protecting America, National Task Force Wages War on Terror,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
August 19, 2008, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/august/njttf_081908. 
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Strategically, a forensic task force stood up in the United States will also need to 
develop stronger partnerships with the private sector and academia. Law enforcement 
alone will not be able to reproduce the results in Israel without these important 
partnerships. Some federal agencies like the FBI and Secret Service fortunately claim to 
already have strong relationships with the private sector and academia.316 Developing 
these relationships further will allow them to gain access to appropriate personnel and 
technology to make them successful. A competent forensic unit will need individuals 
who have the deep technical expertise for telecommunications and computer science 
necessary to exploit encrypted devices.317 The unit will also need to develop or have 
access to innovative tools, much like the NSA, which will be accessed through these 
partnerships.318  
Assuming that the structure and partnerships of the Israel approach can be 
replicated with appropriate modification for the different U.S. context, the United States 
would probably be on even footing with Israel in implementing the approach 
successfully.  
B. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHINESE 
APPROACH IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Chinese approach to encryption policy is multi-faceted. Like Israel, a 
centralized effort, under the Ministry of Public Security, for cyber forensics with 
additional device extraction occurs at local levels. Research indicates some partnerships 
exist with this department, but it is unclear whether they play a significant role in 
decryption efforts. Further, with an authoritarian government like China’s, it is difficult 
to know if partnerships with the government are voluntary or compulsory.  
                                                 
316 “Office of Private Sector,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed January 29, 2018, https:// 
www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-private-sector; “The FBI and Academia,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, accessed January 29, 2018, https://www.fbi.gov/audio-repository/news-podcasts-thisweek-
the-fbi-and-academia.mp3/view; United States Secret Service, “Investigations.”  
317 Susan Landau, “The Real Security Issues of the iPhone Case,” Science 352, no. 6292 (June 16, 
2016): 1399, doi: 10.1126/science.aaf7708.  
318 Landau, 1399.  
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China has also legislated on the issue. Based on laws passed over the past year, 
the government compels decryption assistance from telecommunications operators and 
internet service providers under a broad definition of terrorism. No evidence indicates 
they have made use of the law, but multiple foreign companies have stated they will 
follow the laws of each country in which they operate.  
Having already assessed Israel’s centralized unit dedicated to forensics, the focus 
of the analysis on China’s approach will rest in its decision to compel assistance through 
legal means.319 This stance is particularly important, as it appears it is an outcome still 
sought by some in the U.S. government.320  
1. Legality 
In evaluating the legal implications for implementation of China’s approach 
within the United States, on the face of it, many features would be proscribed by the U.S. 
Constitution. The following discussion, however, develops important additional 
implications beyond this basic observation.  
The idea of attempting to legislate on the issue of encryption is not foreign to the 
United States. Following the public fight between Apple and the FBI, some members of 
the U.S. Congress (MOCs) chose to test the waters. In 2016, Senators Richard Burr and 
Dianne Feinstein circulated a bi-partisan draft bill that mirrored the language in China’s 
counter-terrorism law on the subject. The essence of the Burr-Feinstein discussion draft 
was best illustrated in one of its sections that stated: 
to uphold both the rule of law and protect the interests and security of the 
United States, all persons receiving an authorized judicial order for 
information or data must provide, in a timely manner, responsive, 
                                                 
319 This analysis will expand China’s approach, which on the face, is limited to terror cases. As 
previously argued, China’s definition of terrorism, unlike that found in the Title 18 of the United States 
Code, is extremely broad and may already include more generalized criminal topics. In analysis for 
application to the United States, this thesis operates under the assumption that any laws passed in the 
United States will not restrict encryption assistance only to terror given that this limitation will not 
adequately address the device encryption issue.  
320 U.S. Department of Justice, “Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers Remarks on 
Encryption at the United States Naval Academy”; Department of Justice, Statement of Christopher A. 
Wray. 
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intelligible information or data, or appropriate technical assistance to 
obtain such information or data.321 
However, the bill was not received well by their elected colleagues, technologists, or the 
administration. As a result, the bill was never formally introduced. Questions do remain. 
Legally speaking, could such a bill be introduced and eventually be signed into law? Do 
the requirements placed on companies by China’s law, or something like the Burr-
Feinstein draft bill, exceed Constitutional limitations in the United States?  
As explained in Chapter II of this thesis, present-day encryption relies heavily on 
digital signatures. Many hardware and software manufacturers have designed their 
operating systems only to accept code with digital signatures from those hardware and 
software manufacturers.322 Technical assistance given by companies to defeat the 
encryption security of the device would require code that includes these digital 
signatures. In the Apple and FBI case, the argument was that this feature would be in 
violation of First Amendment rights. In an amicus brief filed by the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation in support of Apple, supporters of this position argued  
Apple is being forced to actually write and endorse code that it—rightly—
believes is dangerous. And in doing so, it is being forced to undermine the 
trust it has established in its digital signature…This is a clear violation of 
Apple’s First Amendment rights, in addition to being a terrible outcome 
for all the rest of us who rely on digital signatures and trustworthy updates 
to keep our lives secure.323  
Although the government vacated its case before litigation occurred, the argument has 
merit. Technical assistance to access encrypted data on a device would likely require 
code to be written and include the digital signature of the hardware or software 
                                                 
321 Compliance with Court Orders Act of 2016, Discussion Draft. 
322 Andrew Crocker and Jamie Williams, “Deep Dive: Why Forcing Apple to Write and Sign Code 
Violates the First Amendment,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, March 3, 2016, https://www.eff.org/deep 
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323 Crocker and Williams; Brief for the Electronic Frontier Foundation and 46 Technologists, 
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Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 3KGD203 (2016), 10, 
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manufacturer; the Supreme Court already determined the First Amendment protects code, 
as a form of writing, in Bernstein v. DOJ.324  
Therefore, there is room to argue that in some cases, such a law could be 
interpreted as violating the First Amendment of the Constitution. If the law was written in 
such a way to articulate that the technical assistance or decryption techniques used would 
not violate the First Amendment (i.e., technical assistance other than writing new code), 
then no foreseeable legal barriers can be seen in China’s approach or that of Senators 
Burr and Feinstein. Nevertheless, even with Constitutional concerns, not much can stop a 
MOC from drafting and introducing a bill that may discernibly exceed the 
Constitution.325 Only after a law is passed, and a challenge filed, would the courts be able 
to listen to arguments and interpret its constitutionality; this process could take years to 
resolve assuming that the legislative action is a change in statute and not a constitutional 
amendment. The reception to the Burr-Feinstein bill indicates both options appear highly 
unlikely to occur.  
Based on this discussion, and in keeping with the scope of the Chinese approach, 
it appears legal barriers do exist to entry. The issue of the political acceptability aspect of 
this discussion is the subject of a forthcoming section.  
2. Cost 
The cost of the implementation of China’s approach to encryption is assessed on 
two levels, the anticipated impact on U.S. taxpayers vis-à-vis government expenditures 
and repercussions for U.S. businesses.  
                                                 
324 Bernstein v. United States Department of Justice, 922 F. Supp. 426 (9th Cir. 1999), http://caselaw. 
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a. Impact on U.S. Taxpayers 
As explained in the previous portion of this chapter on Israel’s approach, U.S. 
taxpayers are already spending millions of dollars for federal, state, and local agencies on 
solutions to device data extraction. The adoption of a law mandating decryption support 
would ease the burden of many of these costs. Contracts may still be written to 
companies like Cellebrite for their basic device imaging technologies, but enhanced 
products or specialized orders would no longer be necessary.  
The cost of encrypted data extraction on its face would amount to administrative 
costs charged by companies to the government. This cost already occurs when the 
government serves a court order to obtain contents of communications, records, or other 
information from service providers. 18 USC 2706, Cost Reimbursement, states: 
(a)Payment.— 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a governmental entity 
obtaining the contents of communications, records, or other information 
under section 2702, 2703, or 2704 of this title shall pay to the person or 
entity assembling or providing such information a fee for reimbursement 
for such costs as are reasonably necessary and which have been directly 
incurred in searching for, assembling, reproducing, or otherwise providing 
such information. Such reimbursable costs shall include any costs due to 
necessary disruption of normal operations of any electronic 
communication service or remote computing service in which such 
information may be stored. 
(b)Amount.— 
The amount of the fee provided by subsection (a) shall be as mutually 
agreed by the governmental entity and the person or entity providing the 
information, or, in the absence of agreement, shall be as determined by the 
court which issued the order for production of such information (or the 
court before which a criminal prosecution relating to such information 
would be brought, if no court order was issued for production of the 
information).326 
Yahoo!, for example, charges the following rates for access to user information 
through legal processes: 
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 Basic subscriber records: approx. $20 for the first 10, $10 per 10 
thereafter  
 Basic group information (including information about moderators): 
approximately $20 for a group with a single moderator  
 Contents of subscriber accounts, including email: approximately 
$30–$40 per user  
 Contents of groups: approximately $40–$80 per group.327  
Verizon, on the other hand, acknowledges that it has a right to reimbursement for law 
enforcement court ordered requests, but claims it does not seek it in the majority of 
instances.328 
The Feinstein-Burr draft legislation on encryption included a similar clause that 
stated:  
(3) COMPENSATION FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—A covered 
entity that receives a court order…and furnishes technical assistance under 
subparagraph (B) of such paragraph pursuant to such order shall be 
compensated for such costs as are reasonably necessary and which have 
been directly incurred in providing such technical assistance or such data 
in an intelligible format.329 
At this point, no known precedence exists for the cost of such assistance for encrypted 
data because no law currently on the books requires assistance. Based on other laws that 
compel assistance from service providers, allowances will likely be made for 
reimbursable costs. Although it is unclear what those costs may be in the instance of 
decryption assistance, it is reasonable to believe that it may be more affordable to the 
taxpayer than the price tag affixed by a company like Cellebrite for decryption. As the 
                                                 
327 Yahoo! Inc. Compliance Team, Yahoo! Compliance Guide for Law Enforcement (Sunnyvale, CA: 
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Manhattan District Attorney’s Office explains, “there may be lengthy and expensive 
discovery battles about the hacking method that would be avoided if the data could be 
extracted through a means provided by the operating system manufacturer.”330 Instead of 
paying a decryption company for access to the proprietary technology or services they 
have developed, which can consequently be price-gouged accordingly, law enforcement 
would only be responsible for the administrative pricing from a device manufacturer that 
provides assistance. The only caveat would be if companies like Apple or Google passed 
the cost on to their customers, in which case, this approach might impact selected 
taxpayers. 
b. Impact on U.S. Businesses 
The cost to U.S. businesses is another factor that must be considered. Any law 
passed in the United States could impact the reputation and hinder the development of 
encryption and cybersecurity capabilities of U.S. companies. The prevailing argument for 
Israel is that its polices on encryption have launched the country into a category of top 
producers of this type of cyber technology while allowing it also to lead the world in the 
cybersecurity field of decryption.331 The public acceptance of laws compelling 
exceptional access is discussed in detail in the following sections, but data does support a 
negative view in the United States of companies that may allow the government to have 
exceptional access.332 In the wake of Edward Snowden’s disclosures, it was estimated 
that U.S. information technology businesses lost revenue ranging from $35B to $180B 
over three years.333 A program focused on legislating exceptional access to encrypted 
devices could have a similar impact. Such action may trigger consumers, in the United 
States and elsewhere, to purchase technologies produced outside of the United States that 
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fall beyond the easy reach of U.S. laws. This approach would impact the revenue streams 
of U.S. companies.  
Technologists have long made the argument that legislation requiring backdoors 
or assistance would lead to a weakening of encryption. Other countries or transnational 
criminal organizations could compromise the methods used by the companies to satisfy 
government regulation that ultimately would impact the reputation and revenues of U.S. 
companies.  
The costs associated with legislation on encryption have positive and negative 
aspects. It is likely that costs for law enforcement to access devices would drop while 
their access would increase, which would be positive for those government organizations. 
On the flip side of this argument, legislation could introduce unforeseen costs to U.S. 
companies that might impact the ability of U.S. companies to remain technology leaders 
in the world.  
3. Political Acceptance 
Political acceptance of China’s approach will be evaluated on the expected 
reception of two groups, the legislative branch and the U.S. population. Acceptance by 
the legislative branch can be measured by the likelihood of approval or willingness to 
initiate legislative action based on previously exhibited behavior. The expected reception 
of the U.S. population can be assessed through previously administered public opinion 
polls on related issues.  
a. Acceptance by the Legislative Branch 
As previously discussed under the legality marker, legislating on the issue is not 
foreign to the United States, but neither does it appear to be palatable. As noted earlier, 
Senators Feinstein and Burr floated a draft of a comprehensive bill that strongly mirrored 
the present law in China. However, the bill was never introduced, a sign that it was not 
received well by other MOCs. Another bill of this nature has not been floated or 
introduced since this one was broached in 2016. 
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As discussed in greater detail in Chapter II, in the 1990s, the Clinton 
Administration attempted to ensure exceptional access by the government through the 
Clipper Chip.334 Leaders in the technology industry, privacy advocates, and MOCs met 
this move with heavy resistance. At the time, Representative Goodlatte strongly opposed 
the Clinton Administration’s initiative, and even introduced legislation in multiple 
congresses, “to affirm the rights of United States persons to use and sell encryption and to 
relax export controls on encryption.”335 At the time, he stated, “Strong encryption 
prevents crime. … [It] allows people to protect their digital communications and 
computer systems against criminal hackers and computer thieves.”336 It was shortly after 
this interview that the administration abandoned the idea of legislating on exceptional 
access. Goodlatte is still a MOC today and made additional comments in 2016 as the 
issue ramped up again. Goodlatte wrote a column for the media in which he opened with 
the statement that, “Encryption is a good thing,” and concludes that U.S. citizens rely on 
strong encryption, a position for which he appears to give unwavering support.337  
At the same time, it is clear that he and other MOCs believe that legislating the 
issue of encryption is Congress’ duty. In the same column referenced previously, 
Goodlatte states he believes Congress must find solutions for law enforcement instead of 
allowing courts to interpret laws that were not written with contemplation for encryption 
issues.338 He and ranking member Conyers formed a bipartisan encryption working 
group that made the following observations at the end of 2016: 
 Any measure that weakens encryption works against the national 
interest. 
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 Encryption technology is a global technology that is widely and 
increasingly available around the world. 
 The variety of stakeholders, technologies, and other factors create 
different and divergent challenges with respect to encryption and 
the “going dark” phenomenon, and therefore, no one-size-fits-all 
solution to the encryption challenge. 
 Congress should foster cooperation between the law enforcement 
community and technology companies.339 
Chairman McCaul of the House Homeland Security Committee and Vice 
Chairman Warner of the Select Committee on Intelligence introduced the Digital Security 
Commission Act of 2016 in the 114th Congress. An important part of this legislation 
would have established the McCaul-Warner Commission, a 16-member commission with 
the following stated purpose of: 
bring[ing] together leading experts and practitioners from the technology 
sector, cryptography, law enforcement, intelligence, the privacy and civil 
liberties community, global commerce and economics, and the national 
security community to examine the intersection of security and digital 
security and communications technology in a systematic, holistic way, and 
determine the implications for national security, public safety, data 
security, privacy, innovation, and American competitiveness in the global 
marketplace.340 
The bill garnered some support and it would have potentially brought the Congress closer 
to legislating on encryption, but it was never voted out of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary (HJC), chaired by Representative Goodlatte (whose stances on weakening 
encryption to assist the government were noted earlier in this section).  
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Assessing the political climate of encryption, it appears that some in Congress are 
interested in legislating on the issue. However, based on the reception of the Feinstein-
Burr proposal, not enough MOCs are interested in moving in the direction of exceptional 
access. Meanwhile, the observations of the Goodlatte-Conyers working group itself make 
no reference to legislating. This continued lack of congressional interest leads to the 
reasonable conclusion that China’s approach would not be politically acceptable.  
b. Acceptance by the U.S. Population 
Relative to the expected reception of the U.S. population, based on the previous 
analysis of politicians’ actions and inactions, it may be expected that congressional 
representatives are responding to U.S. citizens’ reluctance in allowing government 
access. However, an examination of polls relative to the issue at the time of the 2016 FBI 
v. Apple debate illustrates mixed reviews. 
A Reuters/Ipsos poll taken contemporaneously to the Apple v. FBI debate, made 
the following observations: 
 46% agreed with Apple’s position [to resist the FBI’s requests and 
subsequent litigation] to unlock the [terrorist’s] phone, while 35% 
said they disagreed.  
 46% agreed when asked if the U.S. government should be able to 
look at data on Americans’ phones to protect against terror threats, 
while 42% said they disagreed. 
 69% said they would not give up email privacy even if it would 
help the government foil foreign terror plots and 75% said they 
would be unwilling to give up text-message privacy for the same 
reason.341 
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This poll had similar results to one conducted by the Wall Street Journal and 
NBC News: 
 47% said Apple should not cooperate with the government, 42% 
said they should.  
 47% said they feared the government wouldn’t go far enough [in 
monitoring terror suspects’ communications], while 44% feared 
the government would go too far [and violate the privacy of 
citizens].342 
The Reuters/Ipsos and Wall Street Journal/NBC News polls lead people to believe that 
Americans want to keep their device data private. However, two other polls provided 
contradictory results.  
The Pew Research Center conducted polling in the same time period, which 
provided the following data: 
 51% say Apple should unlock the iPhone to assist the FBI 
investigation, [while] 38% say Apple should not unlock the phone 
to ensure the security of its other users’ information. 
 Among those who personally own an iPhone, 47% say Apple 
should comply with the FBI demand to unlock the phone, while 
43% say they should not do this out of a concern that it could 
compromise the security of other users’ information.  
                                                 
342 According to the Wall Street Journal/NBC News, the survey was conducted from March 3–6, 2016 
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 Among those [who don’t personally own] an iPhone, 53% say 
Apple should unlock the phone, [while] 38% say they should 
not.343  
CBS News and the New York Times also conducted their own poll, asking the question, 
“Should Apple create a way to unlock the iPhone of the San Bernardino shooter?”344  
 50% said that Apple should unlock the phone…[and] 45% think 
[Apple] should not.  
 More than eight in 10 Americans think it’s at least somewhat likely 
that if Apple creates a way to unlock the iPhone it will create a 
precedent for the future.  
 Two-thirds think it’s at least somewhat likely it will make other 
iPhones more vulnerable to hackers.  
 Two-thirds also think it’s at least somewhat likely that the 
[suspect’s] iPhone contains information that could help the 
government in its investigation. 
 26% think the federal government has gone too far in infringing on 
people’s privacy in the fight against terrorism, while the 
percentage who thinks the government hasn’t gone far enough has 
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risen. But 58% of Americans remain concerned about losing some 
of their privacy in the fight against terrorism.345 
The Pew Research Center and CBS News/New York Times polls lead people to believe 
Americans may be prepared to accept the government obtaining exceptional access, at 
least in the case of a terror attack.  
Based on the results of these four polls, overwhelming support does not appear to 
lean in one direction or the other on the issue of encryption, even in the context of a 
contemporaneous terror investigation. Given these mixed results, it is difficult to draw 
definitive conclusions as to where people may stand should a law be introduced that may 
compel decryption or assistance from private companies like Apple. It is reasonable to 
conclude that some people in this country may approve of the law while others may not.  
4. Potential for Success 
Using a similar framework for defining success discussed in the first section of 
this chapter, it is possible to evaluate the potential for success of China’s approach in the 
United States by looking at the approach’s impact on the encryption debate and its 
efficacy in obtaining decrypted device data.  
a. The Encryption Debate 
The first criterion of success, whether the method employed resolves the privacy 
versus exceptional access debate, would not be met with the Chinese approach. The 
Chinese approach flies in the face of technologists and privacy advocates. This topic was 
covered in Chapter IV, and would not end the debate, but instead inflame it. Only those 
on the side of exceptional access would find satisfaction with this solution.  
b. The Ability of Law Enforcement to Access Encrypted Information 
The second criterion, whether the method results in the ability of law enforcement 
to obtain usable data from a device that was once encrypted, is more straightforward. A 
law compelling companies or service providers to provide technical assistance or decrypt 
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data on a device is arguably the most effective solution to accessing encrypted data on a 
device. As explained in the previous portions of this section, this approach raises 
concerns about government overreach, could weaken the encryption products sold in the 
United States, and could cause some companies to leave the United States; however, it 
would likely be effective. The issue of effectiveness warrants a discussion on two fronts. 
First, would such a law be effective in gaining the compliance of a company? 
There is no reason to believe that sending a court order to a company that compels them 
to provide decrypted data or assistance in accessing that data would be any less effective 
than sending a court order to an electronic mail provider requesting data from a user’s 
account. Companies served with court orders have historically honored them knowing 
that failure to do so could result in criminal contempt of court, with consequences of fines 
and potentially incarceration for its executives. However, an exception does exist. Should 
the developer of the encryption product be based outside of the United States, significant 
difficulties could occur in pursuing legal means for assistance or decryption. The U.S. 
government would be dependent on its legal attachés in U.S. embassies, its relationships 
with local authorities, and mutual legal assistance treaties. The added layers of foreign 
liaison work significantly complicate matters, and in some cases, make the possibility of 
prosecution insurmountable.346  
Second, would a company served with a court order be able to decrypt data or 
offer technical assistance that would be effective in the pursuit of accessing otherwise 
inaccessible information on a device utilizing encryption? The answer is, to some extent, 
yes. Certainly in the Apple v. FBI case, the government believed Apple could force an 
authorized update on the suspect’s phone’s operating system that would then allow the 
government to attempt an uninterrupted number of passwords to access information on 
the phone.347 Whether Apple developers have the ability to decrypt the data themselves 
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was never litigated; Apple claims that it does not have that capability.348 Since 
companies retain the source code of their operating systems and have intimate knowledge 
of the physical construction of the device, even if they do not have the capability to 
decrypt, they likely have the technical expertise to assist the government in gaining 
access. 
C. FINDINGS 
Using qualitative analysis to assess the markers of legality, cost, political 
acceptance, and potential for success of the approaches of Israel and China, it is possible 
to evaluate the approaches for application within the United States. The previous analysis 
yields the following core observations concerning the approaches of the two countries, 
which are summarized in Table 3:  
 Relative to the structural approach of Israel, with its centralized forensic 
cybercrime unit and strong partnerships with the private sector and 
academia, legal barriers are unlikely; cost benefits are probable but likely; 
political acceptance is likely; potential for success is probable but likely.  
 Relative to the legal framework instituted by China to compel technical 
assistance and decryption from telecommunications providers, legal 
barriers are likely; cost benefits are probable but unlikely; political 
acceptance is unlikely; potential for success is unlikely.  
Table 3.   Charted Representation of the Analysis of the Israeli and Chinese 









Israel Yes Probable (+) Yes Probable (+) 
China No Probable (-) No No 
 
                                                 
348 AppleInsider Staff, “Apple Says Incapable of Decrypting iOS 8 User Data, Even for Government 
Agencies,” AppleInsider, September 17, 2014, http://appleinsider.com/articles/14/09/17/apple-says-incap 
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The findings indicate that in an appraisal of each country’s approach, both opportunities 
and obstacles exist. In this search for a reasonable and effective solution for the United 
States, the obstacles for China’s approach appear to be in categories that would preclude 
its implementation in the United States. On the other hand, the obstacles in the Israeli 
approach are not insurmountable or reversible depending on a number of factors. The 
Israeli approach is a stronger, more viable solution for the United States than China’s 
approach.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The digital infrastructure is not always constructed with adequate regard 
for public safety, cybersecurity, and consumer privacy. Unless we 
overcome those complications, we will remain vulnerable.349 
—Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein 
 
This thesis set out to answer the question of whether the policy options of China 
or Israel offer models to address the issue of access to encrypted devices effectively and 
reasonably in the U.S. context. The basis of the question stems from a renewed debate 
over exceptional access to encrypted data that has churned for over two decades. This 
question has two underlying presumptions: a solution to this debate is needed and China 
or Israel offer models from which a solution can be derived. 
The encryption debate manifests the ideological conflict that has occurred as a 
result of a migration to a technology-based society. Digital technology has permeated 
almost every facet of daily life, and electronic devices are driving this trend. In addition 
to lawful users, U.S. society has a criminal element in possession of devices used during 
the planning, execution, and aftermath of illicit activities. As a result, data and 
information residing on these devices have potential evidentiary value in a law 
enforcement investigation into these activities. At the same time, the encryption of this 
data is present, prevalent, and growing. This encryption is the flashpoint for the debate 
between those who favor exceptional access of encrypted data and those who are opposed 
to it.  
Ironically, both groups in the dispute recognize the need for encryption, as well as 
the need for government access. However, the two are unable to reach a consensus on 
reasonably meeting both requirements, and from this point emerges the national debate. 
Too often that debate has entailed defending philosophical positions rather than finding 
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Naval Academy,” United States Department of Justice, October 10, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
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practical solutions. It is time the government moves on from a philosophical debate that 
has gained little ground in decades. The reality is that encrypted devices are being used to 
facilitate crimes like human trafficking, child exploitation, terrorism, and organized 
crime.350 The government has an ethical responsibility to prevent and investigate these 
illicit activities; policy-makers have an obligation to stop debating and act. 
In evaluating the encryption approaches of other countries, this thesis sought to 
identify such a solution to guide U.S. policy. The selection of Israel and China was 
deliberate, as they offered particularly unique alternative models. Israel, a recognized 
world leader in cyber and security practices, was also notable for its lack of reporting 
within the country on an encryption debate. China, also a recognized world leader in 
cyber, had extensive reporting about the government’s precedent-setting decision to enact 
a counter-terrorism law that compels technical assistance and decryption from 
telecommunications operators and internet service providers. Given these characteristics, 
they fit the appearance of countries with models from which domestic policy guidance 
could be developed.  
A. FINDINGS 
Qualitative analysis was used to answer whether China or Israel offer a model to 
address the issue of access to encrypted devices effectively and reasonably in the United 
States. Examination of their primary approaches revealed a stark contrast between the 
two, with only Israel’s approach having viable characteristics for adoption in the United 
States. The respective policies of the two countries were evaluated in the context of their 
proposed application in the United States using the criteria of legality, cost, political 
acceptance, and potential for success.  
The Chinese model, which resembles a legislative-based solution being proposed 
by the DOJ, the FBI, and others in favor of exceptional access, is not effective and 
reasonable based on these criteria. Attempts to implement the Chinese approach would be 
met with legal barriers, rejection by legislators and the American people, and it would 
have few cost benefits, if any at all. The policy would probably be successful in obtaining 
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encrypted information from electronic devices, but it would do nothing to end the 
encryption debate. It appears to be an unsatisfactory fit in almost every way with the one 
exception of gaining access to information on a device.  
The Israeli approach satisfies many of the previously mentioned criteria and 
already resembles aspects of the decentralized approach the United States is taking 
towards dealing with encrypted data on devices. With its centralized forensic cybercrime 
unit and strong partnerships with the private sector and academia, the Israeli approach 
would not encounter legal barriers or political resistance in the United States. It would 
also likely be cost beneficial, especially to businesses with encryption equities. Although 
the potential for success in obtaining usable data from an encrypted device can only be 
evaluated as probable, if ultimately successful, it will put an end to the encryption debate. 
A U.S. approach tailored to be more consistent in structure with that of Israel has the 
potential to bring the United States closer to a viable domestic solution. 
B. RECOMMENDATION 
Based on the analysis of available information relative to the encryption 
approaches of Israel and China, this thesis recommends implementing a new initiative 
based on the Israeli model.  
1. Conceptual Application of the Israeli Model 
Mirroring the Israeli approach, this thesis recommends changes to the structural 
approach of U.S. law enforcement’s efforts to gain access to encrypted data on electronic 
devices through existing vulnerabilities. The fact that encryption is inherently vulnerable 
is a key takeaway from the initial chapters of this thesis, and Israel’s approach is best 
suited to take advantage of this weakness. Changes to U.S. law enforcement efforts 
include organizing its structure to be collectively and singularly focused on defeating 
device encryption, staffed with the appropriate personnel, and supported by adequate 
resources, all in collaboration with external partners.  
Since it is not realistic for the United States to centralize law enforcement 
organizations, as they are in Israel, applying the Israeli approach in the United States 
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would mean developing a singular unit under the leadership of one agency tasked with 
coordinating the work of federal, state, and local partners. This approach would allow the 
U.S. cybercrime unit to have the traits of the unified Israel Police unit, including a 
centrally functioning coordination center and forensic laboratory under the control of that 
federal agency. Furthermore, given the greater size of the United States, smaller, regional 
forensic laboratories, under the control of the same agency, would mirror the placement 
of cyber officers around Israel, but on a greater scale. In addition to representatives from 
the governing agency, these smaller laboratories would be staffed with federal, state, and 
local forensic agents and officers. Ideally, these personnel would be trained under a 
shared curriculum and to a similar standard to ensure uniformity, validity, and reliability 
for the purposes of maintaining the forensic integrity of processes in the laboratories, 
especially as laboratories seek recognized accreditation. 
Finally, the government will need to build stronger partnerships with private 
industry and academia. A multi-faceted approach by the government that includes direct 
communication and public outreach by the government will help to ensure this approach 
is implemented. Direct communication on the policy level would simply be continuing 
outreach like the Silicon Valley summit between private sector executives and Obama 
Administration officials that occurred in the summer of 2016, and with Trump 
Administration officials over the past year.351 In the view of one academic who has 
researched the encryption issue, a public relations and education campaign can be used 
to, “regain the public’s trust and to garner more cooperation and information-sharing 
support from private industry.”352  
Technology and cybersecurity companies can support many of the endeavors of 
law enforcement, and provide valuable knowledge and tools in the same way Cellebrite 
has for Israel. The alliances with academic institutions are arguably more valuable as a 
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human capital resource and a fountainhead of novel techniques from young, creative 
minds. University programs like MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence 
Laboratory (CSAIL) and Stanford’s Applied Cryptography Group would be ideal 
candidates to approach for assistance. In academic settings, the talents of students can be 
identified, nurtured, and if possible, harnessed to assist law enforcement on technological 
issues relating to reasonable problems like extracting encrypted data from electronic 
devices believed to have been used during the commission of a crime.  
Implementation of the Israeli model would result in creation of a U.S. cybercrime 
unit, more appropriately characterized as a unified forensic task force, singularly focused 
on device encryption. This unit would mirror the structural qualities of the Israeli 
cybercrime unit, its officers in the field, and its strong partnerships with academia and the 
private sector.  
2. Considerations for the Practical Application of the Israeli Model  
This proposed encryption solution in the United States calls for the traits 
identified in the Israeli cybercrime unit to be applied domestically. Given the size of the 
United States, this solution is likely to be best accomplished under federal leadership. A 
unit under the command of one entity in the United States, whether it is one law 
enforcement agency or a joint partnership of multiple federal agencies acting as one 
entity, would be best suited to mimic the unified approach of Israel successfully. A 
similar approach has already been achieved with counter-terrorism efforts of the FBI 
JTTFs under the National JTTF.353 Based on the extensive cyber forensic capabilities of 
the FBI and the Secret Service, the application of the Israeli model in the United States 
may be best suited under one of these agencies. It is also possible that a joint partnership 
of agencies may lead such a unit. Former Director Comey alluded to such an idea during 
a House Judiciary Committee hearing:  
One of the things I’ve been trying to do is drive us closer together with the 
Secret Service because they have expertise...They’ve spent years 
developing that expertise, and so I don’t want to duplicate it, so we’re 
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trying to drive ourselves together. I’d like us to combine our task forces. It 
doesn’t make any sense for them to have an Electronic Crimes Task Force 
and me to have a Cyber Task Force, there ought to be one.354  
Nevertheless, considerations with both agencies, positive and negative, should be noted 
before further research is conducted to best determine the application of the Israeli model.  
a. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Some may readily conclude, based on their knowledge of the law enforcement 
structure in the United States, and the success of JTTFs, that a unified forensic unit 
should reside under the control of the FBI. Given the agency’s statutory authority, 
success with the JTTF program, and vast resources, the FBI certainly appears to have the 
aptitude to lead a forensic cybercrime unit and affiliated laboratories around the country. 
Before marching in that anticipated direction, elements about the application of the Israeli 
approach and the FBI should be discussed.  
First, the Israeli approach may require the selected federal law enforcement entity 
that leads it to distance itself from intelligence agencies. Law enforcement agencies and 
intelligence organizations have distinct missions; the latter continues to come under 
public scrutiny for a myriad of reasons, many of them focused on government overreach 
and the sanctity of civil liberties like the right to privacy. The FBI’s two missions of 
domestic intelligence and criminal investigation are integrated, and are unlikely able to 
be satisfactorily separated. This situation could ultimately detract from efforts to build a 
national consensus on the issue of the novel approach or fail to attract those talented 
individuals outside of federal agencies with vital skills. This pool of potential assets who 
may want to assist would likely recognize the distinction of getting into a telephone of an 
alleged criminal or terrorist versus covert collection techniques used in domestic 
intelligence-gathering missions.  
Secondly, the FBI already has similar programs to the Israeli approach in place. 
The agency administrates the work of about 16 RCFLs in the United States through its 
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RCFL program.355 In addition, the FBI has a Going Dark program specifically focused 
on, “develop[ing] and acquir[ing] tools for electronic device analysis, cryptanalytic 
capability and forensic tools.”356 Based on the testimony of two of its most recent 
directors, and their concern over an unprecedented number of inaccessible encrypted 
devices in their possession, it would appear these efforts have not been fruitful in 
addressing the encryption issue. A closer look reveals inadequacies and room for 
improvement. 
In addition to only operating about 16 RCFLs in the 50 states of the United States, 
with a broad focus on cyber forensics, the DOJ Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
conducted two audits of RCFLs in the past five years that raised a number of concerns. 
Generally, the DOJ OIG found the FBI reported 11 of the 16 RCFLs had backlogs of 10 
or more unique items and, “the current process used to support the information found in 
the RCFL Annual Report is not adequate to ensure the accuracy of the information 
reported to Congress, FBI management, and the public.”357 The DOJ OIG concluded the 
RCFLs in New Jersey and Philadelphia both, “had mixed results in achieving [their] 
performance goals [and] material weaknesses in [their] Cell Phone Investigative 
Kiosk[s].”358 In New Jersey, the RCFL was found to have a material backlog of work and 
an inadequate process for training law enforcement.359 In Philadelphia, data reflecting 
“the number of law enforcement that were trained was inadequate, leaving the FBI unable 
to accurately determine the degree to which the RCFL program is accomplishing one of 
its core missions.”360 Participating agencies of the RCFLs reported being satisfied with 
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the work conducted at the RCFL but only consisted of eight agencies in New Jersey and 
six in Philadelphia, a minimal number when compared to the hundreds of law 
enforcement agencies operating within each state.361 Based on these reports, clear 
indications of performance, scale, and resource issues can be seen.  
Similarly, the Going Dark program also appears to have scale and resource issues. 
Susan Landau draws a strong conclusion in her analysis of the program using the FBI 
fiscal year 2017 budget request as her source.362 She states:  
The FBI has some excellent capabilities in cyber investigations, but not at 
the scale and level for solving today’s problems. The FBI’s Going Dark 
program, responsible for lawful hacking and technical challenges posed by 
encryption, anonymization, and the like, currently has 39 positions (11 
agents) and a budget of $31 million; the 2017 budget requests an increase 
to $38.3 million but no additional positions. By comparison, the FBI’s 
physical surveillance effort has 549 agents and a $297.8 million budget. 
The inadequacy of the Going Dark effort may go a long way toward 
explaining the FBI’s current view of encrypted communications and 
secured devices.363 
The contrast Landau draws to the physical surveillance program raises questions about 
the capacity of the FBI to adequately address an issue that agency and DOJ leaders have 
broached as a grave concern at multiple congressional hearings and public appearances. 
The focus of the program on encryption aside, the limited nature and resources of the 
program make it otherwise incomparable to the characteristics of the Israeli approach. 
The Going Dark program could be a key piece of any policy solution developed in the 
United States, but in its present form is insufficient.  
While much of the previous discussion illustrates concerns about designating the 
FBI as the lead to an Israeli approach to encryption, it also highlights much of the 
infrastructure already in place should the FBI be tasked to pursue the policy 
recommendations of this thesis. As previously mentioned, the agency’s sizeable budget 
of almost $10B and record of success leading JTTFs make it an obvious candidate to 
head up device encryption task forces.  
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b. The Secret Service 
The noted limitations in current programs of the FBI present policy makers with 
an opportunity to look beyond the FBI before implementing an appropriately comparable 
solution resembling the Israeli approach. Consideration should also be given to other 
federal law enforcement agencies to lead this effort. Given the documented successes of 
the Secret Service in cybercrime, and the extensive amount of data forensically examined 
by its personnel, it is another agency worth considering.364  
The Secret Service, an operational component agency of the DHS, is well 
positioned to establish a network of forensic laboratories consisting of a task force of 
public and private partners under its central authority focused on encrypted data 
extraction from electronic devices.  
In 2001, the U.S. Congress passed H.R. 3162, the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act. Within 
that legislation was a section addressing U.S. Secret Service equities that stated: 
SEC. 105. EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ELECTRONIC CRIME TASK 
FORCE INITIATIVE.  
The Director of the United States Secret Service shall take appropriate 
actions to develop a national network of electronic crime task forces, 
based on the New York Electronic Crimes Task Force model, throughout 
the United States, for the purpose of preventing, detecting, and 
investigating various forms of electronic crimes, including potential 
terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure and financial payment 
systems.365 
Since that time, the Secret Service established approximately 40 ECTFs around the 
country, each with a forensic lab in the field office from which the respective ECTFs 
operate.366 These task forces “leverage the combined resources of academia, the private 
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sector, and local, state, and federal law enforcement.”367 These partnerships are strong 
and have helped the Secret Service be successful in prosecutions in some of the largest 
data breaches in the country including TJ Maxx, Dave & Buster’s, and Heartland 
Payment Systems.368 The Secret Service has made remarkable partners in academia that 
have assisted them in investigations, including those with Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory, Carnegie Mellon University, and the University of 
Tulsa’s Tandy School of Computer Science.369  
The relationship the Secret Service has with the University of Tulsa is most 
relevant to this discussion, and could even serve as the template for other labs under the 
Secret Service around the country. According to one report:  
The Secret Service has been running its Cell Phone Forensics Facility, a 
10,000 sq. foot lab, in Tulsa, Okla., since 2008. Two Secret Service agents 
work there full time, aided by students and faculty at the University of 
Tulsa Cyber Corps Program. The facility trains federal agents in digital 
device forensics, invents its own hardware and software for parsing 
evidence from electronics, and uses that technology to examine 40 phones 
a year from police departments around the country.370 
Furthermore, the Secret Service is the only federal agency to operate a standalone cyber 
educational facility, the National Computer Forensic Institute, for state and local law 
enforcement investigators, prosecutors, and judges. At this academic institution, these 
individuals are taught, “how to conduct computer forensic examinations, respond to 
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network intrusion incidents, and conduct cyber crimes investigations.”371 The school 
offers a four-week mobile device examiner and an additional advanced mobile device 
examiner course, which if harnessed properly, could serve to educate and train law 
enforcement staff for regional laboratories.372 
The Secret Service is not without its own perceived limitations in leading the 
Israeli approach. Based on reports and testimony, these limitations stem from 
responsibilities and resources. The Secret Service has an integrated mission, whose 
responsibility includes protecting the President and others along with the financial 
infrastructure of the country. One congressional report argues that the two missions are 
distinct, and the investigations portion detracts from the agency’s need to focus on 
protecting its protectees.373 This argument is partially countered in the same report by 
testimony from former Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Mark Filip of a blue ribbon 
Protective Mission Panel when he is quoted as saying:  
[T]here is certainly some benefits [sic] to be gained from the investigative 
mission to some extent. Now, there is a continuum in those investigative 
activities. To the extent, for example, that cyber investigations involve the 
safety of the First Family, of the President, that is probably going to be 
part of the core mission of the Secret Service.374 
So, although the argument could be made for the Secret Service to be involved in a niche 
position to assist with device encryption since this help could always impact the 
protection of a president, former DAG Filip, like the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, believes that much of the agency’s cyber responsibilities may be 
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better handled by other parts of the federal government while the agency focuses on 
protection.375 At the same time, the Secret Service is a resource driven agency, and all 
indications from testimony of the current director point to an ongoing need to reach 
healthier staffing levels and address attrition issues in the face of surveys indicating a 
morale issue among employees.376  
The negative issues arising from responsibilities and resources of the Secret 
Service should be taken in context. The positive aspects the agency has to offer with its 
ECTFs, cyber forensic laboratories, and partnerships are worth considering in assessing 
the practical application of the Israeli approach. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis stops short of recommending which federal agency or agencies should 
lead this task force. Aside from the potential biases of the author, the practical application 
of the Israeli model is not within the scope of this body of work. The goal of this thesis 
was to evaluate the encryption approaches of China and Israel to determine whether 
either offers a model to address the issue of access effectively and reasonably to 
encrypted devices in the United States. The previous discussion considers two agency 
possibilities for the implementation of the Israeli approach to illustrate the idea that 
multiple options are possible within the United States to execute such a policy decision.  
This thesis recommends that in identifying the leader for a device encryption task 
force, research should explore how the implementation of the Israeli approach by an 
agency would satisfy the criteria used for assessment referenced in the previous chapter. 
Some of the questions that could be asked include: 
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 From a legal perspective, how can an agency ensure satisfactory oversight 
of a group who will be trained to defeat encryption? How can the task 
force better educate prosecutors and judges to ensure the unconventional 
methods of the forensic examiners are understood and accepted? 
 In terms of cost, how can an agency best allocate funding in the 
implementation of this approach to achieve established goals? How will 
the rise of a public sector solution to device encryption influence the 
private sector in this field, and ultimately, affect current price rates for 
decryption services? How specifically will this approach increase cost 
efficiencies for both the government and the economy as a whole? 
 Relative to political acceptance, what practices can an agency rely upon to 
ensure that it sustains the support of political leaders and the U.S. public 
with this implementation? Will the implementation of a task force attract 
the attention of the U.S. Congress, and if so, what are the advantages and 
disadvantages to seeking statutory authorization eventually?  
 In discussing the potential for success, how can an agency recruit the best 
candidates away from their prestigious Silicon Valley and Cambridge 
jobs? How will an agency triage the devices submitted for decryption and 
data extraction to ensure they are able to maintain efficacy and satisfy the 
public they serve?  
These questions are only a few that could be asked to better understand the practical 
implementation of this approach and the viability of a given agency to lead it. Further 
academic research is necessary to investigate fully the breadth of options for this 
approach in the United States. 
Further research on certain aspects of the Israel and China case studies in this 
thesis could also add insight to implementation of the Israeli approach in the United 
States. The Israeli case study revealed a puzzle. Despite the high salience of security 
issues, Israel’s public and political leaders appear content with device encryption policies 
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as (or more) resistant to law enforcement than in the United States. Better understanding 
the sources of this satisfaction could help facilitate political acceptance in the United 
States. The China case study identified the difficulty of uncovering evidence that China 
has used its 2015 Counter-Terrorism Law to compel decryption assistance to support 
political or religious repression or human rights abuses. Discovery of such evidence 
would bolster the conclusion of this thesis that China’s model is inappropriate to the 
United States. 
D. CONCLUSION 
On Tuesday, October 10, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein 
delivered remarks on the issue of going dark to an attendance at the United States Naval 
Academy. As a proponent for exceptional access, he broached the idea of law 
enforcement access that had been left significantly dormant since Director Comey’s 
departure. He stated: 
Such a proposal would not require every company to implement the same 
type of solution. The government need not require the use of a particular 
chip or algorithm, or require any particular key management technique or 
escrow. The law need not mandate any particular means in order to 
achieve the crucial end: when a court issues a search warrant or wiretap 
order to collect evidence of crime, the provider should be able to help.377 
Within hours, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a leading non-profit organization 
representing the civil libertarian views of technologists and privacy advocates alike 
published a point-by-point rebuttal.378 To Rosenstein’s previous point, the EFF states,  
This is the new DOJ dodge. In the past, whenever the government tried to 
specify “secure” backdoored encryption solutions, researchers found 
security holes—for example, rather famously the Clipper Chip was broken 
quickly and thoroughly. So now, the government refuses to propose any 
specific technical solution, choosing to skate around the issue by simply 
                                                 
377 United States Department of Justice, “Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers 
Remarks on Encryption at the United States Naval Academy.” 
378 “About EFF,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, accessed December 10, 2017, https://www.eff.org/ 
about. 
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asking technologists to “nerd harder” until the magical dream of secure 
golden keys is achieved.379 
Two months later, FBI Director Christopher Wray, speaking in front of the House 
Judiciary Committee, made a similar plea to that of Deputy Rosenstein, as the debate 
over encryption continues with no apparent end in sight.380  
Instead of making demands of communications providers and Congress that go 
unanswered, it is time to chart a course that is more navigable. Based on the analysis of 
two options being exercised by other countries, that trail has already been blazed by the 
Israel Police cybercrime unit. This centralized, forensic effort that embraces partnerships 
amongst government agencies along with the private sector and academia is a policy 
solution that should be given serious consideration.  
It is possible that at some point Congress will draft and pass legislation to address 
the encryption issue. Since research for this thesis began, Australia and the United 
Kingdom have indicated they would seek options to compel companies to disclose 
plaintext of encrypted communications legally.381 In the United States, Congress could 
undertake a similar course of action in a matter of days if so motivated, such as in the 
wake of a ticking time bomb terrorist scenario gone badly.382 The sweeping surveillance 
authorities granted under the PATRIOT Act less than two months after the 9/11 attacks 
exemplify this prospect. However, waiting for such an event is morbid, defeatist, and 
negligent with regards to the rising number of encrypted devices that law enforcement is 
                                                 
379 Kurt Opsahl, “Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein’s ‘Responsible Encryption’ Demand is Bad 
and He Should Feel Bad,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, October 10, 2017, https://www.eff.org/deep 
links/2017/10/deputy-attorney-general-rosensteins-responsible-encryption-demand-bad-and-he. 
380 Department of Justice, Statement of Christopher A. Wray. 
381 Jeremy Malcolm, “Australian PM Calls for End-to-End Encryption Ban, Says the Laws of 
Mathematics Don’t Apply Down Under,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, July 14, 2017, https://www.eff. 
org/deeplinks/2017/07/australian-pm-calls-end-end-encryption-ban-says-laws-mathematics-dont-apply-
down; Investigatory Powers (Technical Capability) Regulations 2017, Draft Regulations (London: 
Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2017), https://www.openrightsgroup.org/assets/files/pdfs/home_office/ 
ANNEX_A_Draft_Investigatory_Powers_(Technical%20Capability)_Regulations.pdf. 
382 The ticking time bomb scenario is a situation in which law enforcement captures a terrorist 
suspected of having knowledge of the location of a bomb in a populated area with an imminent detonation. 
In the case of encryption, the thought is that with a near-instantaneous solution of exceptional access, 
authorities would be able to determine the location of the bomb and save lives. See “The Ticking Bomb 
Scenario,” Association for the Prevention of Torture, accessed December 10, 2017, https://www.apt.ch/en/ 
the-ticking-bomb-scenario/. 
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unable to access. This reality underscores why the United States needs to act on a 
solution sooner rather than later.  
In his statement cited above, Deputy Rosenstein also commented, “No solution 
will be perfect.”383 This thesis has noted a number of reasons why the Israeli approach 
would not be a perfect fit to the United States. It is also a solution however that could be 
amenable both to those in favor of exceptional access of encrypted data on devices and to 
those in opposition to it. It also lacks any need for statutory change to the laws as written. 
It will not work all of the time, and in some cases, the time it takes to access an encrypted 
device will be this approach’s worst enemy. However, history has shown that in every 
instance, even when proven to be perfectly secret, encryption is exploitable. Above all, 
this thesis contributes to a growing body of academic literature supporting a view that 
continuing a paralytic debate on the issue serves nobody’s interests. The onus is on those 
who hold absolutist positions in this debate to allow a reasonable and effective solution to 
be implemented in the United States.  
 
                                                 
383 United States Department of Justice, “Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers 
Remarks on Encryption at the United States Naval Academy.” 
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